

***Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek***

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**Title**

***The genesis of hegemony. An explanatory model with the economic approach of the catallaxy of Hayek***

track 7: The role of hegemony

## ***Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek***

### **Abstract**

Globalization, demographic trend, and technical improvements are important factors for deepened societal change. Additionally, we have to cope with lack of well-priced energy and anthropogenic climate change. In this era, the manifestation of hegemonies is on the increase again. In order to compensate hegemonial structures in societies, one has to understand the “mechanism” of hegemony. For analytical reasons, this will be undertaken on grounds of Gramsci and Hayek. The author enhances the catallactic interlocking of Hayek further to a comprehensive model of hegemony. With this perspective, it will be applied to modern political systems, the contemporary economic system, and additionally the welfare state as a particular example for social hegemony. Essentially, one of the main questions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we eagerly ought to deal with, is the consolidation and establishing of legitimacy of social, political and economic societies and preserving their sustainability. In this sense, societies are called upon handling changes of the working environment, increasing socio-economic disparities and ongoing individualisation of lifestyles. End of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the peace research came up with crucial factors for states to be obliged to follow if not to fail. Furthermore, these factors, which have been empirically verified since then and can be called resilient as well, should be seen as a counter program against hegemony. This approach is called the *Civilizational Hexagon*. Evidence suggests that these elements are crucial for sustainable, just and anti-hegemonial societies.

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*"Every social stratum has its own 'Common Sense' and its own 'Good Sense', which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man"* (Antonio Gramsci (1929-1935), prison books, Q1§65, Critical Edition: 76; prison notes, Vol. 1: 173).

### **1. What is hegemony?**

The world in which we currently live is characterized on the one hand by crises and threats to life: wars, conflicts and violence, pandemics, radical changes in the climate. The unequal distribution of wealth and income and discrimination have become stronger again in the Global North for several decades. This also applies to the currently frightening accumulation of misanthropy, racism and xenophobia, modern slavery, individualized and sexualized forms of violence. On the other hand, in our complex society with a high degree of specialization and functionalization, there are challenges and dilemmas for the steering of our coping with existence, which always make us ask for the "right" way. In a scientific understanding, this questioning is not yet ethics, but it is a basic anthropological impulse that stimulates us to think about the world and helps us to find our position in a group or to express ourselves in our personality – and to get confirmed. But it also helps us to question what is taken for granted in our actions and to become aware of it, because this guides us in most everyday situations to make unreflective – more or less – decisions and implement actions. With reference to our everyday language, the self-evident can also be "described" with the so-called 'common sense', which we always like to refer to in conversations. Based on Gramsci, Crehan (2016) formulates common sense as an object "that needs no special education and no evidence to comprehend and accept its truths. They are recognized by society as a whole and are obvious to every citizen of normal intelligence" (ibid.; quoted in Chomsky & Waterstone, 2022: 17). Gramsci goes on to say that "it changes continuously, enriched by scientific notions and philosophical opinions which have entered into common usage" (Q1§65, p. 76; prison notes, Vol. 1: 173). Central to 'common sense' is the notion that it is a "most widespread and often implicit ideology of a social group, of a minimal level" (ibid.). With further consideration, this first meaning is ultimately linked to the notion of 'hegemony', because 'common sense' "works" via unavoidable, unquestionable thought patterns that are understood as absolute and can be implemented in any situation. A second notion of 'common sense' can be generally referred to as a functional approach: it is about the state of available knowledge of people about the world at a certain place at a certain point in time (cf. Chomsky & Waterstone 2022: 18ff.). A third definition is based on the philosophical line of 'common sense', in which it is equated with reason. At its core, 'common sense' and *en effet* 'hegemony' are basically all about rules to be followed. With the question of the development of these rules, one can fall back on Giddens' concept of "structuring": we make and perpetuate the rules in question through our practice, while forgetting the human origin of that rule (cf. Giddens, 1995).

For further argumentation, it is essential to determine what hegemony means. So let us answer this question on the grounds of Antonio Gramsci, whose writings have contributed much to the notion of hegemony. Hegemony is called more generally, a cultural and intellectual organization,

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through which the world view and the order of things corresponding to the way of life of the middle class with their function in social production and reproduction are extended to other classes by generalizing so that the people sharing and respecting them are being controlled by it (ibid.). In this case, it is connected with the 'common sense' from above. This is possible, because the ruling class within the process of generalizing relinquish the rigorous enforcement of their interests (cf. Demirović, 2008). "The fact of hegemony undoubtedly presupposes that the interests and tendencies of the groups, above which the hegemony should be exercised, are taken into account to develop a certain balance of compromise, that is, the leading group are making sacrifices of corporate-economic manners, however, there is no doubt that such sacrifice and such compromise do not cover the essentials, for if the hegemony is political-ethical, then it cannot help to be economic as well, cannot avoid its material basis to be in a decisive function, which the leading group exercises in the ultimate core area of their economic activity" (Gramsci 1996, vol. 7: 1567). In Gramscian thinking, the ruling class, in the course of generalization, takes over to a certain extent the point of views of those ruled by it. As a result, the economic-corporate rational interest of the ruling class itself, will be overcome and its character will be transformed to a manifest non-ruling class. The non-ruling class forms with its logic a society as an integrated entity Unity. By generalization, it leads to a complex superstructure of society with a multitude by civil society and state apparatuses. From this point of view, the criterion for hegemony is politics and culture of specific compromise, which – systematically speaking – evolves to a form of the welfare state and the culture industry (with standardized entertainment).

Summing up, hegemony means a group or organization has decisive, especially economical resources to pursue their interest without rigorous enforcement and actually balancing out multiple interests of a society to reach a political integrated entity.

For the next steps, the ongoing arguing is going to be on the basis of the socio-philosophical and socio-economic theory, with a focus on the aspects of political entities, organisation and leadership. The prerequisite that economic relations and organisational structures are embedded in *cultural webs of meaning* (cf. also Hofstede/Hofstede 2005: 39ff., Whitley 2004) will be proven in that section. So, hegemony is directly connected with *cultural webs of meaning*, by all means, which complies ultimately with Gramsci's thinking. Furthermore, the author assumes that the common good economy as counter program against hegemony – due to the virulent and cumulatively effective processes of change in a global transnational and transcultural economy (cf. Carey 2019) – is currently at a turning point. "We are now living in a new kind of transitional society in Western countries, in which the afore mentioned societies are being structurally transformed by a global interdependence. Through modern communication technologies, new forms of economic cooperation and organisation, political arrangements and communication structures (networking) are emerging" (Preyer 1998: 9). Hence, hegemony being analysed on the basis of Hayekian/Careyan theory of *cultural economics* in order to firstly grasp its initial situation and secondly its structural dynamics in socio-economic terms.

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In the second step, the paper deals with the dilemmas a state has to cope, because these dilemma situations are prone for hegemony structures and surely interesting to know. Looking on society, which are facing deep structural changes, from this point of view and its potential to produce common goods as counter program against hegemony, it is made clear that they need the civilizational potential of the state to produce further common goods. Consequently, cultural and economic transformations have to be looked upon on the socio-economic development model (by Carey). Some aspects of governmental power in post-modern societies, e.g. the evolution of necessary state functions and the transformation of the welfare state and the economic system are to be discussed subsequently. As a result, latent modes of governance can be identified.

Because the state and the economic order have constituted in the last centuries a liaison, the existence better yet the regulation power of the state on behalf of hegemony is vital for this analysis. With the transformation<sup>1</sup> of reference systems – state, economy, and society – to the reference system "world" in modernity or late modernity (cf. Reckwitz 2019a, 2019b), this gives rise to the next question: how can political communities deal with this turbulence in the political-economic conditions, against chaotic impact on leadership and therefore against hegemony? The term which is normally used is resilience and was conceived in psychology for individuals or groups. In this context, it is transferred on organisation as well. According to Palzkill & Schneidewind (2014: 36) resilience is the ability of an organisation model to keep up the relevant benefit promise even with unexpected and challenging conditions and shocks. In this case, it is necessary to develop plausible resilient factors for entities to deal with these striking defiances. This will be undertaken by the *Civilizational Hexagon*, which empirically underlines circumstances of good policies to establish just state order. Because the political state and the (social) organisation are very similar in their functionality,<sup>2</sup> one can adopt the *Civilizational Hexagon* on societal organisations to devise resilient factors as well. The question that usually arises at this point is the question of the "new mechanism" of socialisation. Initial thoughts on this topic have already been presented in previous remarks (see Carey 2017ff.). In this context, however, we are concerned with the issue of resilience of political entities and organisations in the 21st century to transform hegemony to *isonomic* forms. Supposing that resilience is strongly connected with society, the key question is: Which resilient factors are able to cope with the impact of societal hegemony as Gramsci has envisioned? From this on, a *Civilizational Hexagon* can be verified by empirical reasons, which can ensure favourable conditions to secure an *isonomic* political order and a civilizational potential for balancing out hegemonial structures.

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<sup>1</sup> The author understands transformation – detached from the political science (also Marxist), business administration or information technology background – to be a temporal process that involves a significant change, reorganisation or adaptation of a (e.g. political, economic or social) system as a result.

<sup>2</sup> You can recognise the similarity in the resemblance of macroeconomics and business administration.

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### **2. Significance of cultural economics for hegemony: The further development of the Hayek-Careyan thinking for *isonomic* leadership**

*"The worst institution ever created among men is money! It ruins cities, it drives people from their homes, seductively beguiles even good characters, entices righteous people even to act badly! It showed mortals the way to every wickedness, and shows a path to every work of sin".*

(Sophocles 1995: 295ff., V)

This was already stated by Sophocles in his *Antigone* in the middle of the 5th century BC, and in this tragedy, he beautifully depicted the conflict at that time between traditional values and the (new) political-social order. The world at that time (cf. Noll 2018: 10ff.), in which this work was written, can in many aspects very well describe the current situation of the late modern and *post-industrial* form of society and, as well, with consequences for the public economy (in Europe) as an analogy: an increase in "commodity-money relations", the becoming visible of a stronger social differentiation between the poor and the rich, the free and the "slaves" and a pronounced or growing individualism. In this context, some economists and many social scientists also diagnose crisis-like events for our present period (see for example Reckwitz 2019a: 239ff.).<sup>3</sup> The author also shares the view that the public economy is at a turning point with the virulent social changes named above. The question that usually arises at this point is the question of the "new mechanism" of socialisation. Initial thoughts on this topic have already been presented in previous remarks (see Carey 2017ff.). In the following sections, however, we are concerned with the issue of hegemony on basis of Gramsci. In other words, the key question is: Which resilient factors are able to cope with the impact of societal hegemony as Gramsci has envisioned? The starting point for the argumentation is leadership and organisation.

Starting with the phenomenon of 'leadership', it emerged, this is the ethnological state of knowledge (cf. Noll 2018: 36ff.), with the process of sedentariness in the *Neolithic* Age (the *Neolithic Revolution* beginning about 12,000 years ago), while we have had our cultural capacities unchanged for about 40,000 years. "Researchers [are] largely agreed that the cultural abilities of Homo sapiens of the Upper Palaeolithic from 40,000 BC onwards no longer differed fundamentally from those of modern humans. At this time at the latest, the cultural evolution to the present human being was completed in its basic features" (Parzinger 2016: 62). On the basis of studies, e.g. on the *tonowi* among the Kapauku-Papuas in West New Guinea (cf. Pospíšil 1982), it manifests itself as a "person in charge" of the actual functioning of the social group – with basically the same "job description" (in terms of *soft skills*) as modern leaders: authority figure, mediation, conflict resolution, decision-making and organising. It is evident that humans (with very few exceptions) do not (or cannot) live outside social groups (see also Carey 2016). In

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<sup>3</sup> Reckwitz analyses three current, cumulative crises: socio-economic, socio-cultural and democratic-practical crisis, which coincide in the form of a deregulation crisis. Streeck (2015) presents a crisis of democratic capitalism via the transformation of the consolidation state into the debt state. Mason (2018) assumes that capitalism of the current type is collapsing and that a new (knowledge) economy is emerging.

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parallel, the necessity of 'organisation',<sup>4</sup> which is, in modern times, also considered as the manifestation of "a catalogue of norms and rules expanded by constant experience, formed by the compulsion of economically and politically [and technically<sup>5</sup>] conditioned relations" (Noll 2018: 64), arises out of human cultural development – with a steady differentiation (scilicet division of labour). In contrast, the modern definition of 'organisation' additionally emphasises the special rationality (goals, planning and control), which is meta-logically the characteristic thinking of today's knowledge (business) society. Since humans are biologically or genetically adapted to a group size of 130-150 people (cf. Aiello, Dunbar 1993: 189; Hill, Dunbar 2003: 65), she/he needs "artificial" (institutional) organisations to manage larger groups (Noll 2018: 63). For instance, North (1990) defines institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, convention, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics" (op. cit.). And these institutional organisations, not only to enable control but also a (cultural) development to modify organisations, do not require any kind of isolatable memory content ("*memes*"), but above all a semiotic structure, a system of meaning or information (cf. Taschdijan 1987: 425-438). Therefore, people's actions are always embedded in a cultural environment. "Cultural factors are not only part of both the goals and the means of development, but they can also have a central function in the formation of values" (Sen 2007: 37; see also Biesecker, Kesting 2003). This is especially true for socio-political action. This ("new") economic research direction, which in our opinion is essential for understanding the public economy sector, is known as ***cultural economics***,<sup>6</sup> which was classically founded by *Friedrich August von Hayek* and *Douglass Cecil North*. So, culture is understood as "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation" (Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales 2006: 23).<sup>7</sup> This basic term is explicitly necessary to primarily understand economic processes as being embedded in the social contexts, to explain them on behalf of their historical-genetic developments and to bring to light ideological "certainties" within the mainstream economic theory.<sup>8</sup> Hayek in particular understands the market in his logic as a *market process theory*. "The special characteristic of market process theory is that market processes and economic evolution are explained by tracing them back to the permanent reproduction of market intransparency or uncertainty" (Wegner 2005: 157f.). According to this, we are subject – in addition to a fundamental limitation of our knowledge – to an all-encompassing uncertainty. To compensate for this, we use our sensory and cognitive abilities to develop structures of order (rules and institutions) (Hayek 1954: 110; North 1990: 27). "We will consistently call 'order' a state of affairs in which diverse elements are so related to each other in large

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<sup>4</sup> "So even the simplest life is full of demands for ideas, will, intention to organise and initiative to organise. Otherwise everything ultimately sinks into muck, and in the end into death. Organisation is thus the elixir of life par excellence". In this context, see the convincing historical consideration by Claessens 1998: 151-164, here: 154.

<sup>5</sup> Insertion by the author.

<sup>6</sup> *Cultural economics* can be seen as a current of *evolutionary economics* (cf. Märkt 2007: 180ff.), and this can be subsumed under the umbrella term of *lifeworld economics*. This is about the "interplay of lifeworld and economy with regard to the design of a sustainable economy" (Jochimsen et al. 2004).

<sup>7</sup> This definition is mainly used in empirical English-language research. In German-language research, reference is made to Geertz (1983, 9: 194ff.): Culture is a "fluid system of meaningful symbols permeated by conflicting values and norms, [understood] as a 'self-spun web of meaning' in which man is enmeshed".

<sup>8</sup> Zweynert, Kolev and Goldschmidt also use the term *contextual economics* for this.

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numbers that knowledge of one spatial or temporal part of the whole allows us to form correct expectations about the rest, or at least expectations that turn out to be correct with considerable probability" (Hayek 2003, 38). These human-given structures of order thus emerge to cope with the limitations of our cognition (or knowledge) and uncertainty in the world. In fact, Durkheim (1999 [1893]: 270ff.), Parsons (1949: 93f.) or, more recently, Eisenstadt (1990) have already pointed out that the coordination of interactions is highly volatile without the *construction of meaning* (Eisenstadt) and without the structuring power of values and norms. Thus, nowadays there is little doubt that competition, self-organisation or economic evolution is mainly influenced by values and norms (Märkt 2007: 189). Hayek and North early analysed on how great the influence of institutional structures and rules in a society is on economic success (cf. Hochloff 2019). Both authors conceived a connection between culture, thinking, learning, action, institutions and the economy. Crucial to this argumentation in Hayekian thinking is the difference between **spontaneous** and **established order** (Hayek 1963: 15-29). A set or established order is one which is "achieved by bringing the parts into relation with each other according to a preconceived plan, we call in the social field an organisation" (Hayek 1963a in Vanberg 2011: 63) Corresponding and translating to the knowledge theory, its characteristic should be categorised as 'available single point knowledge' [see Reckwitz 2019b]. Spontaneous orders, on the other hand, are "results of human action but not of human design" with reference to the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson (cf. Hayek 1966 in the same 1991: 92ff.). They emerge on the basis of individual intentional actions and constitute unintended consequences or social entities that have an effect on the individuals. Again: speaking in terms of knowledge theory, the category is 'decentralised knowledge' (the literature speaks of "dispersed (problem-solving) knowledge"). It is Hayek himself who points out that economically relevant knowledge in a society „never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess" (Hayek 1948: 77). In this sense, one can recognise that structural organisational theory is not build upon dispersed information at all, but by centralising of information. If one studies Hayek's writings with regard to his logical thought to "spontaneous orders", then one cannot help but notice that his thinking already anticipates current theories of self-organisation, autopoiesis, network organisation, etc.. Therefore, Hayek's remarks should also be understood in this sense. The critic formulated against this theoretical approach, such as those by Kaven (2015), are too simplistic and do not do justice to Hayek's thinking. In terms of the history of ideas, he is to be connected to the intellectual "founding fathers" of the liberal market economy. He has never seen himself as neo-liberalist in the middle of the 20th century nor to the perverted interpretation of liberal economics since the 1980s to the 2000s. As I already said, the later and incorrect term of "neo-liberalism" (which is actually a "retro-liberalism") is historically wrong and should no longer be used in scientific terminology (cf. Trecker 2023, Carey 2017). Today's populist "retro-liberalists" who refer to Hayek only take a one-sided and superficial view of him.

The decisive and yet neglected point in the writings of the above-mentioned authors is the question of the **interlocking of** spontaneous and established patterns of order. While Hayek and North primarily consider order structures dichotomously and **within the** respective order specifics, Carey develops and substantiates the social philosophical theories (especially by Hayek) into a

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***catallactic***<sup>9</sup> interlocking (that is **general** or **1st order**) between spontaneous and established orders. Hayek uses the concept of catallaxy, which is located in economics, in a new perspective to explain the functioning mechanism and the emergence of a market (as a spontaneous order) (cf. Hayek 2002: 169ff.). "A catallaxy, then, is the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market when people abide by the rules of property, liability and contract" (Hayek 2003: 260). In fact, Hayek does not recognise that catallaxy as an emergent principle cannot be applied only to the market. Furthermore, he does not undertake a deeper logical analysis regarding the connection of spontaneous (in terms of knowledge theory: 'decentralised knowledge') with established orders (in terms of knowledge theory: 'available single point knowledge' [see Reckwitz 2019b]), which a priori precedes the Hayekian catallaxy and his concept is thus 'only' a **second-order catallaxy**. Consequently, Carey expands this concept to a more fundamental philosophical concept of a social dynamic, which the author calls catallaxy of the first order and which, at this point, means the interlocking mechanism of spontaneous and created order in a society. This argumentation is theoretically supported if one takes the "problem of knowledge sharing" as the basis for this argument.<sup>10</sup>

Therefore, the functional mechanism for *catallactic* interlocking lies in the constitutive principle of *reciprocity*, which – arguing with ethnological reasons (cf. Mauss 1990 [1925]; see also Carey 1999) – occurs unquestionable throughout archaic to modern social systems (ibid.) and is decisive for the evolutionary *communalisation* of individuals. Furthermore, a new sociological study about world relationship and the task of (late modern) *communalisation* comes to similar results (cf. Schauer 2023). With reference to Hannah Arendt (2008 [1958]: 62-65) and her three dimensions – environment, contemporaries, temporality – Schauer constructs the different world relationships by three axes forming self-referential aggregated identities: time and history, publicity, and city. In all dimensions one can conceive *reciprocity* as a basic constitutional factor for *communisation*. Because of the necessity of *reciprocity* within social relations, self-interest **and** social motivations are *interpenetratively* (cf. Luhmann 1984: 286ff.) linked in our thinking. Therefore, humans are at most in a minimal understanding *homines oeconomici*, but mainly *homines culturales*.

Speaking in terms of evolutionary dynamics: in order to achieve long-term stability for social entities, the spontaneous order must first be connected with an established order (1st order). On this basis, more complex structures can unfold (2nd order). This corresponds exactly to Luhmann's idea of autopoiesis, which is about connectivity and not repetition, as the older systems theory still claimed (cf. Luhmann 1984: 60ff.). In order to make this mechanism functional (with the aim of long-term stability), the following "factors" in particular need to be worked on: trust, rule regulation, meaning construction and legitimation (cf. Eisenstadt 1998: 31). In this respect, the *reciprocal* coupling of the 1st order (spontaneous order with established order) and 2nd order (from ego to alter **within** a pattern of order) like e.g. organisation or leadership can be understood both as established order and at the same time as spontaneous order. The related empirical phenomena of these terms can now be understood very well with this conceptual

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<sup>9</sup> Derived from the Greek word "κατάλλαττειν" [katallattein] or "κατάλλασσειν" [katallassein] = equivalent to 'to exchange', 'to integrate into the community' or 'to turn from enemy to friend'. Cave: Not to be confused with κατάληξις [katalexis] (in English: reducing, closing) (see Hayek 2002: 170).

<sup>10</sup> The point of reference can be found in rudimentary form in Streit/Wegner (1995: 31ff.).

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analysis. Applied to the above two terms, it shows: 'organisation' as established order forms for example to 'company'; 'organisation' as spontaneous order for example to the particular family. 'Leadership' as established organisation to for example to 'management', 'leadership' as spontaneous order to e.g. charismatic leadership or authentic leadership. The diagram (Fig. 1) depicts the socio-philosophical and cultural-economic connections of Hayek and - in further development - of Carey.




Fig. 1: Hayek and North's **cultural economics** and Carey's further development of the **catallactic interlocking 1st order** of spontaneous and established order via the principle of *reciprocity* to explain the interrelationships and interactions of 'organization' and 'leadership' (own representation)

In summary, the following statements (already partially confirmed empirically) can be derived, which also form the basis for understanding of the functioning of society and hegemony:

1. The respective characteristics of an economic system are not rigid, but correspondingly dependent on the thinking and actions of the actors, which are mainly and directly shaped by the specific social structure of the actors.
2. In a world of generally limited knowledge, actors develop structures of order, namely institutions or rules, in order to cope with the uncertainty resulting from this cognitive dilemma. These cognitive order matrices, described by Hayek as **patterns of thought**

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or by Carey as **thought-calculi** (see the first sections and Carey 1999), form the respective economic system and shape the organisations and leaders operating within it. In addition, the specific legal system, as demonstrated by legal anthropology, always "functions" as an order and production protection function (of the political and economic community) (cf. Noll 2018).

3. Institutions **emerge** via *reciprocity* as spontaneous orders ('decentralised knowledge') or are **constructed** as established orders ('available single point knowledge' [cf. Reckwitz 2019b]) via *secondary* and *tertiary rules* (cf. Wolfe 1990: 615-648).<sup>11</sup> 'Leadership' and 'organisation' are 1st order *catallactic* interlocking by ***reciprocal emergence*** and ***singular construction***, which can only attain a high degree of stability in this manner (cf. Williamson 1996: 268f.; Kubon-Gilke, Weiler 1995). This stability of orders can then be transformed in a 2nd order *catallactic* interlocking – as described by Hayek, but also North<sup>12</sup> – to a meta-order, such as an institution of a market process.
4. **Hegemony** derives from the **catallaxy** (first order) between spontaneous orders to established orders. With the input of material energy, resources (capital, law, power etc.) can be obtained for restructuring becoming interlockings with catallaxies of second orders. It tries to maintain a catallactic balance of first and second orders. The (sudden) change of resources can change thresholds and disturb balances.

Hayek emphasizes that (spontaneous) market transactions must be based on trust and reliability in order for the market to fulfill its functions. With the embedding of humans as actors of communitarisation, the cultural aspect plays an essential role in economic thinking. The individual and collective values of people are an indispensable part of culture and flow into economic theory and practice.

A mathematical formalism in this regard can be formulated via the so-called *alternative economic theory* (hereinafter cf. Ebersoll/Benker 2014: 22ff.). Just as Luhmann takes a special view of the relational complexity between the elements in his theoretical structure and the corresponding interrelationships, the interaction of the (standard) variables (the so-called "particles") is of eminent importance. The following standard variables can currently be found in AWT:<sup>13</sup> consumption C, human activity A (cf. Hanke-Ebersoll, 2015), the particle number N (cf. Bärtl, 2005; Ghirardini, 2013; Ebersoll/Benker, 2014), the economic volume of  $V_{ök}$  (cf. Ebersoll/Junkermann, 2011; Benker, 2004), the legal structure L (cf. Gansneder, 2001; Ebersoll, 2006: 139ff.), the history of systems H (cf. Junkermann, 2006), the economic impulse  $P_{ök}$  (cf. Ebersoll, 2006: 180ff.; Ebersoll & Junkermann, 2011: 115ff.), the consumption of direct energy E (cf. Lorenz, 2012), the consumption of geospheric input factors (short: raw materials) R (cf.

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<sup>11</sup> Wolfe examines evolutionary control media and classifies them according to: primary rules = genetic rules, secondary = cultural rules, tertiary rules = (individual and collective) decisions and organisations.

<sup>12</sup> North also assumes a dichotomous order structure, but calls it *formal* or *informal order* (cf. e.g. North 1993: 61ff.).

<sup>13</sup> Multidimensional quantities are often marked with Sütterlin letters in AWT. In this article, these are "only" written in bold and italics.

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Lorenz, 2012), waste  $M$  (cf. Lorenz, 2012), foreign trade  $F$  (cf. Ebersoll/Junkermann, 2011: 58ff.), the economic power  $K^*$  (cf. Lieglein, 2008: 33; Ghirardini, 2013: 42).

Formalized, as a GIBBS function or, in the case of transformation, a so-called GIBBS main equation (GME) can be formed (cf. Straub, 1997: 73; cf. Falk, 1990: 216):

$$K^* = g(A, C, E, F, H, L, M, N, P, R, V)$$

The consideration of the variables as partial quantities (i.e. partial differentials),<sup>14</sup> which are then again functions in their own right, leads to an inner GIBBS function, which is simplified (and with abbreviated symbolism) shown below:

$$dK^* = \alpha \cdot dA + \xi_C \cdot dC + \xi_E \cdot dE + \xi_F \cdot dF + \xi_H \cdot dH + \xi_L \cdot dL + \xi_M \cdot dM + \mu \cdot dN + \nu \cdot dP + \xi_R \cdot dR + \rho \cdot dV$$

The intensive standard variables resulting from this equation are: the economic relevance  $\alpha$ , human activity  $A$ , the value conversion factor  $\xi_C$  for consumption  $C$ , the energy-induced rate of economic power  $\xi_E$  for the factor of consumption of direct energy, globalization coefficient (formerly foreign trade coefficient)  $\xi_F$  of the globalized economy  $F$ , the economic communication coefficient  $\xi_H$  for the system history  $H$ , the economic multiplier of the legal structure  $\xi_L$  for the legal structure  $L$ , the waste-induced loss rate of economic power  $\xi_M$  of the factor waste  $M$ , the particle potential  $\mu$  of the number of particles  $N$ , the momentum coefficient  $\nu$  of the economic impulse  $P$ , the commodity-induced rate of economic power  $\xi_R$  of the consumption of geospheric input factors (in short: raw materials)  $R$  and the economic pressure  $\rho$  in connection with the dynamic share of the economic volume  $V$ . The result should be the differential of economic power  $K^*$ . Thus, the individual summands act as sources of economic power – and for hegemonial structures, so to speak.

This formalism covers the individual levels and the dynamics of the catallactic interlockings in Fig. 1 very well:

For culture and order  $KO$ :

$$dKO = \alpha \cdot dA + \xi_C \cdot dC + \xi_E \cdot dE + \xi_F \cdot dF + \xi_H \cdot dH + \xi_L \cdot dL + \xi_M \cdot dM + \mu \cdot dN + \xi_R \cdot dR + \rho \cdot dV$$

(the only thing missing is the magnitude of the economic impulse  $P$ , which is mainly located in the economic system).

For action: human activity  $dA = \alpha \cdot dA$

For institutions, the system of law, organization, and leadership:

$$\text{the legal structure } dLO = \xi_L \cdot dL + \alpha \cdot dA$$

For the economic system  $dK^*$  with the main GIBBS equation above.

<sup>14</sup> The 'd' in the formula stands for differential and denotes the proportion of the increase of a variable or a function and describes an (infinitely small) section on the axis of a coordinate system. Mathematically, a distinction can be made between extensive and intensive variables. The extensive variables provide information about the extent of a system and the intensive variables provide information about marginal proportions (cf. Straub, 1989: 108). This means that intensive quantities of two systems (of different magnitudes) are always directly comparable (cf. Ebersoll, 2006: 73).

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The catallactic interlockings of the 1st and 2nd orders can be found in the coefficients  $I_{ka}$ :

$$I_{ka}: [\xi_C; \xi_E; \xi_F; \xi_H; \xi_L; \xi_M; \mu; \nu; \xi_R]$$

The structure can be understood as a n-step model in the sense of a neural networking logic with an experience- or time-based smoothing function<sup>15</sup> (see Fig. 2; cf. Ertel, 2016: 265ff.):




Fig. 2: Two stages of modellizing a neural particle network (n=2): a formal model with particles and directed connections between them (top); the structure of a formal particle that applies the activation function  $f$  to the weighted sum of all inputs (below) (Ertel, 2016: 267ff.)

With this formalized view, it becomes evident that the economic system is very much shaped by the regulatory structure of a community, or rather its culture, its legal structure, and its human activities. From this, hegemony can be formally described. Even if this explanation of an economic

<sup>15</sup> The "charging" of the activation potential is done simply by summing the weighted ( $\omega$ ) output values

$x_1, \dots, x_n$  of all incoming connections via the formula  $x_i = f\left(\sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} x_j\right)$ . The discontinuity in binary activation

of particles is smoothed out by a sigmoid function such like  $f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\frac{x-\theta}{T}}}$  with  $x_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{falls } \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} x_j < \theta \\ 1 & \text{sonst} \end{cases}$ , and  $e$  = Euler's number and  $T$  = smoothing parameter. This smoothing parameter can be interpreted as factual experience value.

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system is very challenging due to its abstractness, there are advantages of transparency and better analysis possibilities, maybe even better political control (respective to advantages cf. Benker et al., 2015; Ebersoll et al., 2021a). As an example, one can apply this equation on a health care system. In this form of GME, terms such as "the health care system", "the education system", "the food industry", etc., do not appear. It is well known, that these terms are often collective terms with diffuse content and that their meanings can be interpreted in many ways. For the economic description, one should use this equation to understand the health care system not as an absolute quantity, but as a certain area of society, which can have points of contact with all the sizes mentioned. For example, certain combinations of sizes or their variations are particularly interesting, e.g. (cf. Ebersoll et al. 2021b; Ebersoll/Benker, 2014: 30ff.):

- The number of particles  $N$  and the potential coefficient  $\mu$  cover the personal aspects (e.g. health care workers) on the one hand, and the institutional aspects (e.g. hospitals, doctors' surgeries, but also health insurance companies) on the other. Among the particles, however, is also the group of the working population as potential beneficiaries as well as contributors. The potential number of patients is represented by the entire resident population.
- Vector  $A$  includes human activities, such as health-related activities. The partial size  $\alpha$  covers, among other things, its labour costs.<sup>16</sup> The size  $\alpha$  can also be used to map the activity-related financing contribution to health and long-term care insurance. It also includes increasing (medical) technical support.
- Consumption  $C$  includes health services (e.g. treatments) and material goods consumed (e.g. medicines) at the corresponding prices. This also includes the purchase of health insurance cover. The so-called value conversion factor  $\xi_C$  also covers, among other things, the entrepreneurial activities of service providers. In this context, this factor is interpreted as the catallaxia coefficient of whether consumption (and the sales of service providers) takes place via spontaneous orders (i.e. via the market) or via established orders (i.e. institutions: health insurance companies, health administration, care administration or youth welfare offices, or other social facilities, etc.).
- As already explained, an essential part of regulatory economics, and of the health care system in particular, is the legal structure  $L$ . In addition to the specific structure of the same, the state contributions to the health fund pursuant to § 221 SGB V should also be mentioned here as examples. However,  $L$  also includes legal disputes in social and health law. In this sense, size  $L$  preserves the system and focuses on the use of funds for structural maintenance in order to keep the health care system "running".

As a result for hegemonial structures, one can look on the formula again:

$$dK^* = \alpha \cdot dA + \xi_C \cdot dC + \xi_E \cdot dE + \xi_F \cdot dF + \xi_H \cdot dH + \xi_L \cdot dL + \xi_M \cdot dM + \mu \cdot dN + \nu \cdot dP + \xi_R \cdot dR + \rho \cdot dV$$

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<sup>16</sup> Alpha  $\alpha$  – like  $A$  – has a vector form and consists of the components of the socio-technical intensity  $\alpha_T$ , i.e. the use of medical devices, the incentive via payments for activities  $\alpha_Z$ , i.e. labour costs, and the non-routine potentials  $\alpha_{NR}$  (cf. Hanke-Ebersoll, 2015: 162 ff.). Non-routine situations (NRS) are situations that cannot be covered by automata. In order to cope with such situations, professionals need a wealth of knowledge and skills that must be mobilized ad hoc in order to make decisions quickly and competently.

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Consequently, with the GME all system-describing macroeconomic variables of a political entity can be described with varying impacts and discover hegemonial structures, because it sets out to be – in words of Gramsci – an equilibrium between the elite and others. As a matter of fact, one can derive from the operators of the formula the vital resources for hegemony: human action, the supply of products, energy, globalisation, ethnic culture, the law system, waste, particles (population, institution), economic impulse, the economic power, raw materials, and its catallactic coefficients to establish dense, enduring structures. Only one dimension, at minimum, may be sufficient, to shift the balance to a new hegemonial level. Because for calculation threshold overcoming shifts, this formula was actually developed. After conceiving the basics of culture economy for society in general, it is time to apply this approach for the political system in the next sections.

### **3. The political structure of hegemony: security, economy, ecology, culture (values), and organization**

Rosenau wrote in 1990 that a historical sequence of international-political relations is beginning. Actually, it began in the mid-17th century with the reorganisation of Europe after the Thirty Years' War (cf. Rosenau 1990). In fact, 30 years later, we can see that the above-mentioned historical sequence has not come to an end, but that many of the political actors have taken big steps back into the politics of the 20th century (cf. Ther 2019; Otte 2020): openly expressed nationalism, hidden or distinct imperialism, strengthening right-wing populism and re-emerging fascism/right-wing extremism, and racism lived out unabashedly and staged in the media. Basically, in the 1990s, with the overcoming of the systemic competition between capitalism and socialism, we had a window of opportunity for a real new humanist politics of improvement for global peace and the reduction of social inequality. In fact, after the "Cold War, we lost the peace" (Ther 2019: 43ff.; Otte 2020: 21ff.). A close political and economic analysis even reveals that we are in a transitional period from a declining (US) world order to a new world order dominated by China. These phases are – historically – extremely precarious. Graham Allison has studied such particular phases in world history, showing that in three-quarters of the cases of "world order shifts", war was the result (Allison 2018). Meanwhile, at this critical time, the European Union is showing itself to be internally torn and unable to act. It is also revealed that state sovereignty is increasingly being relativised by the intensification of the contexts of action and increasing interdependencies – both internally and with an outward effect. This agglomeration of transnational interactions and processes can be described as *globalisation*. Due to comprehensive demands of multipolar conflict management strategies and ecological, economic and social challenges, an ever-increasing need for action and decision-making is being induced at all political levels.

Characteristically, not only the need for "*ethnocultural identity*" is obviously increasing, once again, many politicians are increasingly using the category of *nation(alism)* as an emotional resource and an inner-worldly source of meaning, i.e. as an offer for political identity (Schoch 1996: 83). In his numerous studies, Deutsch has pointed out that despite the internationalisation of many areas, above all the movement of good, capital, and technology, the advance of worldwide division of labour, production, communication and information, national contexts of expectations and actions are becoming denser and more in-depth (e.g. already early in Deutsch 1969). Thus, the paradox becomes apparent: "The world is structured more internationally than

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before and yet at the same time has become more national in many areas" (Senghaas/Senghaas 1996: 260).

In addition, the political structural dilemmas of actions in the areas of security, development and economy, ecology, values, and coordination will be discussed (see Fig. 3).




Fig. 3: Dilemma pyramid; ID = interdependence (Carey 1999: 53)

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### **a) security dilemma:**

Well known in the political analysis is the *security dilemma* (cf. Knapp/Krell 1996: 12f.), which describes the behaviour of political units in an environment of "structural anarchy", i.e. the absence of a superordinate political authority. The former East-West conflict is a typical example: it escalated inexorably to the point of threatening mutual annihilation. The *security dilemma* is as old as the coexistence of organised collectives.

With the uncertainty about the intentions and behaviour of others, each unit feels that its options for action are either limited by the other side or, in extreme cases, that its existence is threatened. The actors believe that they can only rely on their own strengths and resources (self-reliance). Defence and enforcement strategies are developed in conjunction with an arms race. Since everyone exists under these conditions, the *security dilemma* produces an escalation and a self-containment of strategy mechanisms and arms production. This dilemma inherent is a potentially violent character. At present, we have virulent security dilemmas between North Korea, South Korea, the USA and bordering states; between Pakistan and India, between Israel and various bordering states; and starting again between the USA, Russia and China (especially in the Southeast China Sea) (cf. Joe 15.02.2019; Kramper 1.05.2019).

There are several alternatives to overcoming or compensating *security dilemmas* (cf. Senghaas 1994: 124f.) instead of deterrence: Since the problem lies in the deficient reliability of expectations,<sup>17</sup> for overcoming it must start at this point. Conceivable, for example, would be a hegemonic order, which provides for general security. Another possibility can be found in contractual security communities or international organisations (cf. Zürn 1997; Müller 1996). A more far-reaching integration as in the case of the EU neutralises the security dilemma completely. However, the *militarisation* of response modes, as history proves, seems to be easier to manage.

Through an *economisation* politics (in the sense of the logic of trading states), security policy of conventional nature will no longer be at the top of the agenda, at least within the Western OECD club. In the remaining areas, the interdependencies are not as dense or do not exist at all, so that "small" conflict constellations that is without a global impact, are always possible according to the principle of a *security dilemma*. As shown above, the security dilemma becomes relevant again at the global level.

This *militarisation* or *evasivisation* of political relations means, as described, the turning of the (political) confrontation towards security and *safety* of the political unit. The (legitimate) question of the preservation of power is linked to the question of survival. *Security* is thus calibrated to existential threats. This perception becomes clear in the following (cf. Wæver 1996: 48):

*"If we cannot master this problem, all the rest will become irrelevant; we will no longer be able to cope with future challenges in our interest (because we will no longer be free or even exist). By defining an issue as a security issue or security problem the actor in question assumes the right to claims the right to address this problem by 'extraordinary'*

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<sup>17</sup> Here, reliability of expectations means the transparency of the intentions of all major actors, the calculability of their interests and a broad coordination of their actions (ibid.).

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*means. This may take the form of taxation, war levies or bonds, secrecy or the restriction of other - constitutional - inviolable human and civil rights."*

Precisely this perspective is as old as the security dilemma and has been "used" excessively in the political language of the global North since the attack of 9.11.2001 in New York. Already in antiquity, such a pattern can be found (on a smaller scale).<sup>18</sup> For traditional "national security", this means that the particular actor in political areas that are considered to be part of high security categorises these as top priority and claims for himself the right to use the "necessary" means, including the use of force, to counter these threats (Wæver 1996). The mechanism of *militarisation/evasivisation* of political relations works on setting of differences, i.e. demarcation outwards (with regard to political unity) and, as a side effect, on condensation or compression of interaction patterns within the community (or political identity<sup>19</sup>). With the question of political survival as the supreme maxim, the points of reference of the contentions are directed towards the political community space as a kind of coordinate zero point (in-group/out-group processes). Depending on how far the social infrastructure, the system of communication, transport and the possibilities of creating a political identity or a group consciousness are developed, the sphere of impact outreaches on the basis of the in-grouping/out-grouping. There is also evidence that the establishment of religiously inspired communities, especially the world religions "work" according the same pattern. The doctrine of "*bellum iustum*" with the constitutive condition of the inside-outside relationship can easily be found here (cf. Heshmati 1996: 73-81).

Accordingly, in antiquity the early advanced civilisations developed along rivers (China, Egypt, Mesopotamia) or in smaller geopolitical areas (e.g. Crete, the Mayan Empire, Japan, city states), more rarely along trade routes (Persian Empire). In these condensed and consolidated spaces of interaction the respective geographical framework conditions, different culturally specific approaches to solutions, which led to science (astronomy/astrology, mathematics, physics and philosophy) and the first political "constitutions". In this way, the political became apparent in a *community of persons*, which gave its members a legal order and protection from the outside (ibid.). The community was an association of convenience. Aristotle opened his *Politics* with the statement: "Since we see that every state is a is a community and every community has come into being for the sake of a good (...)". In the constitution of *communities of persons*, law emerges from the overall complex of behavioural regulation as a relatively independent part and, in the course of its genesis, sets itself against custom, conventions and ethos (cf. Noll 2018; Höffe 1996: 25). Law, which develops independently of culture in all communities from a certain stage of civilisation consequently acquires an anthropological rank (ibid.: 10f.).<sup>20</sup> In criminal law e.g., the anthropological quality is shown by three conditions: the capacity for violence of human beings, the lack of a protective armour resistant to violence and the lack of an inhibition of violence and killing against his peers (Höffe 1996: 35).

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<sup>18</sup> As the best example, reference is often made to Thucydides (1976).

<sup>19</sup> This includes exactly the political identity: the definition of one's own position will be enabled by the negation of the opposing position (Daase 1996: 455).

<sup>20</sup> Already in the ancient Babylonian code Hammurabi one can see the same basic subjects regulated: Criminal law (crimes of honour, property, sexual offences and homicide) and civil law (marriage, family and inheritance law, contract and trade law). See also Noll 2018.

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Thus, the mechanism of *militarisation/evasivisation* amounts to demarcation and densification (concentration) of the political community (initially at the beginning city or island).<sup>21</sup> Of course, existential threats have to be perceived by the community, i.e. without a potential "enemy" the *militarisation calculus* cannot work. Through natural transport routes (rivers, etc.) the community space is extended (*natural inclusion*), since in a natural competitive situation (scarcity of resources and need for security) the political unity tends to have an expansive moment. However, this *natural inclusion* can only come about if the task of protection from outside, within the group and the establishment of a political identity are successful. The limits thus lie in geographical conditions and in the scope of the political space, in which the mobilisation of people for the use of resources and to create a political identity take place. This is, of course, dependent on the communication and information technology available. The establishment of political identity has its own laws and cannot be extended indefinitely. If the identity is too "constructed" and has not "grown", it can be replaced by other (e.g. local or regional) identities or be displaced, e.g. in Spain the Catalans and Basques or the Scots.

In this context, the *nationalism* movement also plays a role.<sup>22</sup> With the establishment of large communal spaces (and the loss of the religious as a force for order through devaluation [Habermas 2019]), orders are imagined or according to Max Weber *believed* (cf. Francis 1965: 49f.). Through the spread of telecommunications technology and the extension of its reach, the scope for shaping the region might be so large that there is inevitably a "sense" of *nationalism* required in order to be able to secure the political unity for its further existence. That's why, the national feeling or *nationalism* is something modern (Schoch 1996: 61). Hayes succinctly summed this up: "Nationalism as a world phenomenon could, quasi, only come with the help of the machine" (Hayes 1929: 48).

Or:

*"With the social modernisation and social atomisation, accompanied by the triumph of science, the quality of nationalism corresponds to an inner-worldly religion. If scientific progress weakened traditional religious feelings, the requirement for metaphysical integration grew among the individualised at the same time. Nationalism as a secularised community of the living with those who have died and those who will live in the future satisfies this need" (Schoch 1996: 62f.).*

Senghaas also confirms that nationalisms lies in the "demarcation of one's own (...) community vis-à-vis the outside" corresponding with simultaneous self-reference and, by pathological increase, lead to a "delusion of superiority"<sup>23</sup> (Senghaas 1994a: 74). Thus, nationalism was with its emancipative components of the constitutional states development an important step on the road to modernity, but also shows a Janus-facedness through its particular form of aggressiveness (cf. *ibid.*: 69ff.). The militarisation principle makes use of the power of nationalism in precisely this sense: internally as a mobilising resource and also as a cohesion factor, externally linked with a totalitarian exclusivity, demarcation, delimitation and intolerance.

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<sup>21</sup> We find something similar with regard to the historical development of the territorial state in Meyers (1991: 220-316, here: 258ff.)

<sup>22</sup> Because securing of the identity is an elementary motive for national and nationalistic movements starting from ethnic groups (Senghaas 1996: 116).

<sup>23</sup> The term was coined by G. Elwert.

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In the concept of nationalism it could be recognised that the confrontation with an adversary ("enemy"), provided that vital interests are at stake or there are no geopolitical options, lead to an immanent logic of violent actions. In the event of the destruction of the adversary (or a group of adversaries), the "victor" is allowed to add the now ungoverned territory to his own (*violent inclusion*). However, violent inclusion "works" best with a superiority of resources. In the case of a (real or perceived) balance of power the urge of expansion is stopped and encrusted into a bloc. If the military potential increases in such a way that the adversary cannot be completely eliminated, so that the aggressor himself must reckon with his destruction in the event of an attack (*second-strike capability*), then even in this case the demarcation cannot be overcome. Both were the case in the East-West conflict. Without greater (geographical) room for manoeuvre (apart from limited possibilities in Latin America and Africa), the conflict was fuelled by the *security dilemma*, but hardly overcame it. On the contrary, the conflict escalated into a multiple capacity for destruction. Without the possibility of inclusion and communitarisation of the adversary and without the prospect of another (more threatening) enemy, it would never have been overcome if other calculations had not become relevant for politics.

Conclusion: *militarisation/evasivisation* of political relations functions according to the principle of in-grouping/out-grouping, i.e. the perception of existential threats (e.g. by an enemy image) to the survival of the political unit. In this, actors work toward delineation and toward integration and cohesion of the community as an association of cooperation and purpose. By altering traffic and communication flows, larger structures of community space can be built with a simultaneous adjustment of out-grouping in the case of *natural inclusion*. Personal-political identities are thereby transferred through collective identities to a national feeling. Here, the more expansive the identity space, the weaker the associated feeling. If the personal identity is threatened by loss of life, then the mobilizability is highest. National identities therefore become particularly strong when they enter into symbiosis with personal identity through mass media and mass psychology. Limits lie in the communalization process and in the potential threats, especially from competitors. When there is a lack of room for manoeuvre and potential for evasion, e.g., when needs essential for survival are affected, violent confrontation ensues. With the neutralization of the threat, i.e. the destruction of the adversary, the boundary setting can be overcome (*violent inclusion*). Otherwise, there is no external integrating power inherent in *militarisation/evasivisation*. Thus, it only ever builds new boundaries until a bridging of the gap is possible either via natural or via forcible inclusion. Within the political unit, regulation (and juridification) ultimately leads to the sovereign nation-state. In the case of geopolitical limitations and/or due to an equilibrium of resources or a second-strike capability, bloc formation becomes entrenched and there is no chance for active policy-making at this level.

### **b) development or economic dilemma**

Another structural dilemma, the *development/economic dilemma* has not existed as long as the *security dilemma*, namely only for about 150 to 250 years (cf. Senghaas 1994: 121 and 137ff.). With a constantly interconnected world and different levels of development, specific problems have become topical, which are described by the terms "problem of catching up development", "displacement competition" and "peripheral pressure".

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As know-how, organisational skills and technological innovations diverge, the economic system unfolds into top and laggard economies. Without protective barriers, the less efficient economies are exposed to supersessional competition from the strong ones. This could be seen drastically after the introduction of the currency union in the former GDR (1 July 1990). Economies that can only imperfectly hold their own face of competitive pressures, become peripheralized. The problem of "catching up development" is posed by the conditions of a hierarchised world economy.<sup>24</sup> The *development dilemma* is no longer virulent only in the global South, but has spread via Eastern Europe to the Federal Republic of Germany with the Eastern federal states since 1990.

The approach to overcoming the *development/economy dilemma* lies in linking up with the lead economy (association) or, if necessary, in the case of lacking own resources or protective measures, in decoupling (dissociation). In contrast to the *peripheralization* of economic areas with long-term downward mobility, the successful processing is to be seen in a catching-up development as has been shown in the development of East Asia in recent decades. Crucial and virulent is a "modern" compensation of the dilemmas: economic marginalisation and discrimination, usually combined with political and cultural alienation, are being replaced with a policy of *ethnopolitics* or *ethno-nationalism*.<sup>25</sup>

Not only economic, but also political and ecological disruptions in the developing regions cause streams of refugees which go all over the world and can hardly be absorbed regionally. The OECD-region is and will be even more affected (cf. Carey 2018c). The drug trade and terrorism will find their "markets". Militant behaviour will proliferate as frustrations rise and will be seen as an appropriate medium of communication. The effects of *ethnopolitics* and its cruel consequences in the disintegration process of the former Yugoslavia were noticeable. Thus, the *development dilemma* is an important structural factor in politics. It can even have an impact on security policy. With its early beginnings, but especially since the last World War, this second calculation has now become topical: the ***economisation of politics***. While under the prevailing *militarisation and evasivisation logic*, various homogeneous legal, economic and cultural areas with central political governance (e.g. common currency, general binding of laws, uniform school system), i.e. *classical* nation-states, have ceased to exist, in the course of further action more and more economic criteria became decisive.

Depending on the environmental parameters this principle works either an economic imbalance of competences prevails due to the given structural conditions or an egalitarian-structured, possibly interdependent, economic profile.

The first case of a competence gap is the most likely situation to be encountered empirically. Schumpeter himself pointed out in his work "Theory of Economic Development", that (capitalist) markets are by nature always in disequilibrium (Piper 1992: 25). The disequilibrium of the framework conditions from a developmental point of view is also of decisive importance (cf. Amin 1986). In this context, supersessional competition and peripheralization are obvious facts

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<sup>24</sup> This problem is known for a long time, but still unsolved, although this topic prevails on the scientific agenda.

<sup>25</sup> *Ethnopolitics* means that (political) identity is at stake. This is not a matter of fact-oriented interest politics but strongly about the constitutive conditions of political communities. On this emotional level, the connection with ethnic groups, language and religion are relevant. With ethnonationalism the formation of a separate "national" identity stands over the securing of territoriality, establishment of a national economy and homogenisation (ibid.).

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(Senghaas 1994: 61). This became clear, for example, through the rapid industrialisation in Great Britain in contrast to the other European countries, or the colonisation processes and post-colonial developments in the "Third World" (so-called North-South conflict). In this situation, *economisation* has a strong effect: not only geopolitically but also qualitatively and instrumentally. With rivalry new markets must be established in order to maintain supersessional competition. One can even say that *economisation* the decisive engine of globalisation (cf. Lemper 1994: 49-55). Expansion goes hand in hand with a qualitative increase and diversification of the traded good. Furthermore, there is a strong development in using of technical means in all sectors, especially in transport, communication and information sector. Consequently, utilitarian thinking is becoming more and more important.

Accordingly, we currently find a number of multinational processes of marketing, removal (outsourcing) and diminishment (*downsizing*) (cf. Barnett/Cavanaugh 1995; Reich 1991). The name of this new mode of production is "flexible accumulation" (Harvey 1989). This means that it is no longer a question of satisfying only material needs, but to create an even higher demand for consumption through the "active production of demands" (Klein 1996: 85). This is achieved through extensive advertising, which is based on famousness, image and status of objects and people (cf. Reckwitz 2019a; Leiss/Kline/Jhally 1993; Baudrillard 1981). The *economic* principle is just as dependent, perhaps even more so, on the embedding of lebensraum in a communication-technological infrastructure. Without a connection to the global communication networks, there can be no integration through *economisation*.

However, it also relies on the difference: centre and periphery (cf. Nohlen 1989: 1157f.; also Lemper: *ibid.*). In the case of marginalisation i.e. decoupling from the (world) trade- and information flows, a performance of integration can be only achieved by integrating the periphery into the centre (cf. Castells 1992: 63ff.). A transaction on the part of the centre area is extremely unlikely and only imaginable if elementary economic or geopolitical parameters change, be it through a new technology or a new constellation of powers. A good example is probably the international toxic waste business. Whereas in the past, developing countries, which had no interesting raw materials for the world economy, dependent on the discretion of individual states, they became "businesslike" again for the toxic waste business (cf. Seager 1991: 68f.). Furthermore, the burden of overcoming borders lies with the periphery. The disconnected countries have to find a way to connect to the routing system.<sup>26</sup> A prime example of this is the Southeast Asian states, foremost South Korea and Thailand, which, without significant energy and raw material resources, have managed within the last decades to become a serious competitor to the EU in the world. For the centre this means the development towards economies with high performance and redistributive capacities with expanded participation rights and educational opportunities. "(T)he welfare state is the result of a successful national system of *political economy*" (Senghaas 1994: 75). From an economic point of view, with sufficient domestic economic consolidation, economic primacy is oriented towards a free-trader cosmopolitan pattern of market.

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<sup>26</sup> Senghaas talks about mobilising of a development nationalism to link oneself to the lead economy, subsequently, to build up a competition pressure against it („counter penetration“) and to get a top position by its own power („dependency reversal“) (1994, p 62). Cf. *ibid.*, pp 63ff.

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As a matter of fact, we are currently seeing (again) a new differentiation: (weakening) centre (USA) versus (strong) centre (China), which can and does lead to an aggressive *economisation*. The growing economic power of China is challenging the (old economic) power of the USA (cf. in the following Otte 2020: 23ff.). The more the end of the post-war order fades, the more other (allegedly as the case may be) potential states act to fill the power vacuum. Potentatism is currently rampant on the periphery of Europe, in the Near and Middle East and in Asia (Russia, China). In this context it encounters the political weakness of the EU/Europe and the Western-oriented OECD states. Economically, a skills gap can be observed between China's economy and the (weakening) US economy: China's economy reached the economic strength of the USA in 2013 and overtook it (measured in purchasing power parities; see Fig. 4). At the same time, the US continues to have an exorbitant appetite for imports and consumption (see the rapid decline in US net foreign assets, regardless of the different US administrations from George W. Bush to Barack Obama and Donald Trump in Fig. 5). The biggest creditor of the USA here - besides Japan and if Hong Kong is added to China (!) - is the People's Republic of China.<sup>27</sup> This global economic situation is highly unstable and can be considered dangerous in the context of the above. The USA is therefore openly pursuing a strictly protectionist course and using its structural power to enforce its nationalist interests: alignment of globally important markets, especially the financial markets, the energy market and the telecommunications market according to US rules (including sanction instruments derived from national interests) in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in the international payment system SWIFT and legally initiated punitive payments through the US judicial system against unwelcome foreign competitors (cf. Stiglitz 2005: 210ff.; Otte 2020: 103ff.).

In fact, there is also the second case of an egalitarian level of competition. Here, the expansionism is no longer so aggressive, i.e. potential conflicts tend to follow the pattern of "give and take" (as was the case – before the former US president Trump – in the economic relations of the triad USA-EU/EFTA-Japan was also common and possible (e.g. the trade dispute with Japan – which took place in the 1990s – as a result of strong Japanese car exports or massive (predatory) software dumping into the USA) and no longer via "win or lose" outcomes in economic imbalanced constellations. A potential for integration is not to be found here either, but due to *economisation* with equally competent trade structures, the centres experience a stabilising moment without the potential for merging. In fact, the principle of *economisation* at this level implies the possibility of an integration of (centre) trade structures.

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<sup>27</sup> US Department of the Treasury (2019): Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, [www.treasury.gov](http://www.treasury.gov), online: [<https://www.gold.de/staatsverschuldung-usa/>], Accessed December 2019.

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


Fig. 4: According to GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), China's economy overtook the US economy in 2013 (Source: Statistic Times with World Bank and IMF data, [<http://statisticstimes.com/economy/united-states-vs-china-economy.php>], access: 2.08.2019).




Fig. 5: US net foreign assets since 2007-2020 (Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Online: [<https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IIPNETINQ>] (24.08.2020)).

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However, this option is rarer, as it depends primarily on three boundary conditions: 1) development of efficient economical internal profiles (Senghaas 1994: 62) with a clear shift of employment from the primary to the secondary sector and tertiary sector and a strong urbanisation process; 2) acting of political units in one and the same economic area (Lemper 1994: 51); and 3) related to this, the development of an interdependent economic network (cf. Miller 1995: 100-121) through a strong internationalisation of the production apparatus transport, networks, communication and information technologies. The first and second conditions are so substantial that there is rarely any potential for integration. As far as we know there is only one case in which all three conditions were fulfilled, so that the *economisation* of international relations led to integration into higher-level alliances: the EC/EU.

A look back at the beginnings of the EU/EC confirms the potential for integration. This shows that the beginning of the institutional development, which led to the formation of the EU, lies in the establishment of the European Community for Coal and Steel (ECSC, Montanunion) by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries in 1951. With the signing of the Rome Treaties (1957), the European Economic Community (EEC) (and the European Atomic Energy Community - Euratom) was founded in 1958. The EEC Treaty defined in Art. 2 (version of 1957) as its main objective "by the establishment of a common market and the gradual approximation of the economic development of economic activities within the Community, to promote a steady and balanced economic expansion, greater stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states which are embedded together in this Community." At the same time, the free and unimpeded movement of good, services, persons and capital should be ensured, all quantitative restrictions on imports and exports abolished and all customs abolished. A common policy in the areas of fisheries, agriculture and competition was defined. The European Investment Bank, founded in 1958, became the EEC's central credit institution. In 1959, the European Development Fund (EDF), a common mechanism for development policy was established. The European Social Fund, founded in 1960 became the basis for labour market and employment policy. This was followed in 1962 by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), which subsequently became the means of financing the EEC's common agricultural market. Thus, since all the constitutive conditions – the economic area of Europe was shared by several highly competent and highly industrialised states, whose intensive relations led to a highly interdependent economic network - the principle of *economisation* could be effective by all means, the problem of the *security dilemma* was neutralised within this group and could create superlateral structures which came to an effect in other domains like security and foreign policy. The *economisation* of the relations between the actors is therefore capable of overcoming *militarising/evasivisation* calculations. This is also indirectly referred to by Kreile, who states that the politicisation categories in African countries without any significant differentiation of socio-economic interests tend to be more violent than with a differentiated economic and social structure (Kreile 1997: 18).

### **c) ecological dilemma**

The problematic treatment of nature and the earth's resources is increasingly being addressed (cf. e.g. Wallace-Wells 2019). In this context, *homo economicus*, a selfish utility maximiser (cf. Sen 1984, vol. 2: 200-229), is replaced by *homo oecologicus* with a cyclical-evolutionary

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contingency consciousness of common good<sup>28</sup> contrasted with this. Although this problem area has existed for a long time,<sup>29</sup> it has only become politically explosive in recent decades as the interconnectedness of ecological cycles and their global impact have become clear.

One starting point was the first environmental conference held in Stockholm of the UNO (1972). The following ecological crisis were named as examples, which are by now great political issues: the loss of genetic resources, extinction of plants and animals (threat of biodiversity), destructions of regional ecosystems (e.g. the Wadden Sea), the deforestation of forests, especially the tropical rain forest, progressive desertification, the air, water and marine pollution, scarcity of freshwater supplies, the oversettlement of urban areas, the erosion of the soil, destruction of the ozone layer in the stratosphere (ozone hole) with a simultaneous increase in ozone near the ground (smog), the greenhouse effect with rising sea levels, etc. Thus, in the sense of a "world risk society"<sup>30</sup> threats are distributed transnationally. It affects everyone, whether industrialised or developing country.<sup>31</sup> At present, it is already apparent – and the extent will become even greater in the future – that military threat situations are intermingling with the processing of ecological threat potentials (cf. Wallace-Wells 2019). The most serious current example is Syria: from 2006 to 2011, there was a drought that lasted for years and resulted in massive crop failures. In addition to the "Arab Spring", the domestic ecological and economic crisis gave rise to political unrest, which led to the outbreak of civil war and resulted in a refugee crisis that continues to influence European states and the cohesion of the EU to this day. Gleick, for example, tried to record the known water-related conflicts since 1900. He came up with a number of 500 conflicts, about half of which occurred after 2010 (Gleick 2018)! The event of the destruction of the Kachowka embankment dam in the warfare between Russia and the Ukraine is to be named at this place as well.

This means that a transition from the logic of *militarisation* emanating from a power management via an *economisation* with the sign of *individualisation* to the *ecologisation* with a collective calculation of optimising interests is on the way. The only question is when the process of *ecologisation* will have reached the point where it can cope with the huge pressure of problems in this area and can take drastic countermeasures by the majority of the several populations.

In this context, the *ecological dilemma* has a dual threat quality: on the one hand, it is about correcting environmental damage; on the other hand, it is also about avoiding the ecological collapse of the earth (cf. Senghaas 1994: 158ff.). This means not only a consolidation of the status quo in energy expenditure and in the use of resources by (large-scale) consumers, but also a considerable reduction and reorientation in the consumption behaviour of the main polluters (the OECD-countries, including the East Asian emerging economies, account for about 60% of

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<sup>28</sup> Common good are good that (can) be used by everyone and its consumption no one can be excluded. The damage or destruction of the commons by rationally calculated maximisation of utility was already pointed out by Hardin (The Tragedy of the Commons 1968: 243ff.).

<sup>29</sup> The karstification of the Balkan area is due, for example, to deforestation for ancient Roman shipbuilding. Macchia, an evergreen shrubbery of the Mediterranean region, was created by deforestation. In Madagascar, due to the method of shifting fire cultivation and overgrazing only 1/8 to 1/5 of the natural vegetation remains.

<sup>30</sup> In a risk society it is no longer a question of eliminating a lack of satisfaction of needs, but about the distribution or elimination of the risks of civilisation with hazardous situations (Beck 1986: 61ff.). Cf. also Senghaas-Knobloch (1992: 53-71).

<sup>31</sup> However, as Meyer-Abich points out (1996: 221ff.), the global South and in particular the LLDCs especially the LLDCs will suffer most from the global changes. He therefore speaks of the new eco-colonialism. See also Wallace-Wells 2019.

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environmental damage to the environment<sup>32</sup>). Without efficient alternatives in environmental, energy, economic and transport policy in the area of industrial- and emerging economies the development regions are imitating this western modernisation path and exacerbate the ecological catastrophe. Even without imitation to avoid an irreversible collapse the industrialised countries must abandon their relentless overexploitation of resources. "The real global ecological dilemma is that without an ecology-oriented restructuring of the economies of highly industrialised societies and without resource saving and energy saving developments in the 'catching up'-regions the ecological catastrophe in both parts of the world go like a bull at the gate, albeit for different reasons" (Senghaas 1994: 159). A continuing effort for cooperation requires a widespread insight of the deleterious long-term effects of short-sighted, individual benefit maximising behaviour. Thus, the turn of political action towards collective learning processes is emphasised.

The characteristic about the *ecology dilemma* in contrast to the *security* and *development dilemma* is that the effects are truly global, i.e. no one can escape this potential threat.<sup>33</sup> Everyone is in the "spaceship Earth" and the dangers can be proven or experienced by everyone. Perhaps there are different interpretations of the available data, but the consequences remain the same. This state of affairs points to the possibility in the perspective of being human, to see and act equally and culturally and to act in a culturally neutral way. This starting point of anthropological egalitarianism could, however, enable the consensus to create superlateral structures with a *voluntary* renunciation of the (absolute) principle of sovereignty on the part of the state, at least in the area of the *ecological dilemma*.

With the latest *ecologisation* of politics a qualitatively new structural feature of the political and social level could now develop, since, as already indicated, the *ecologisation* fundamentally does not differentiate but integrates. Here, no political units are taken as points of reference, but rather the starting point is the threat to humans existence as inhabitants ("participants") of natural, highly interdependent and complex, "chaotic" and entropy-generating matter- and energy exchange systems (on the concept of entropy, cf. Mainzer 1995: 74ff.). By making these referential exchange processes conscious individuals are mobilised, leading to an increase in the politicisation of social forces and to a corrective of political action not only locally, regionally and nationally, but also transnationally (cf. Czempiel 1996: 337-367). *Ecologisation* therefore has a potential for integration, which the other structural principles (*militarisation, economisation*) do not have, and it is capable of overcoming peace and development breaches. As with the institutional emergence of the European Union through *economisation*, it can be predicted that development of global structures can probably cope with the perceived global threats.

If the thesis of the change of practice-deciding calculations of action from *militarisation/evasivisation, economisation* to (for the time being) *ecologisation* of politics is correct, this could firstly provide an understanding of the changes at the global level, secondly – more elementarily – we get an idea of their structuring potential, namely what they can achieve (principles of effect) and how much they can perform (limits of effect).

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<sup>32</sup> Cf. statista 2016, [<https://de.statista.com/infografik/6050/laender-mit-den-hoechsten-co2-emissionen/>]; state: 30.09.2016.

<sup>33</sup> Unless you postpone the problem to future generations and hope that they will find a solution in the acute crisis – according to the principle of *deus ex machina*, so to speak. The other possibility, of course, would be for the politicians not to care about the victims at all and deliberately enter into the tragedies!

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### **d) coordination dilemma**

With the development towards a social world, cross-border contacts (traffic, information, communication, etc.) and mobile people are becoming the norm (cf. Weiß 2017). Particularly in political fields of action, the density of interactions has the effect of a flood of information and leads to an increase in complexity (cf. Willke 1996: 35ff.), and consequently also to a higher pressure of expectations and control competence on the responsible actors ("revolution of rising expectations" [Beyme 1991: 131]). In this context, the buzzword "ungovernability" was coined, which was first popularised in the report of the "Trilateral Commission" (Crozier et al. 1975).

A highly mobile society equipped with a dense network of communicative interaction has a potential for politicisation that exponentially reinforces rationalities based on short-termism and particular interests, resulting in a counterproductive overall effect for the political system (Senghaas 1994: 161). For the task of optimising collective positions, there is therefore an indispensable need for coordination of individual action. Senghaas consequently poses the question: "Will the decisive actors in international politics seek to realise their self-interest through uncoordinated, unilateral, i.e. nationalistically motivated measures, or will there be coordinated-multilateral behaviour in the sense of an 'enlightened' self-interest oriented towards long-term goals" (ibid.: 162)? Coordination structures, by their very nature, need to be embedded in different contexts. Whether *security*, development or *ecology dilemmas* - in each area the coordination task requires specific structures of its own.

With the security dilemma, efforts of the last decades have become topical through a kind of evasive interdependence. An evasive interdependence would have the task of overcoming the security dilemma, which is characterised by a self-dynamic arms race between political units (or groups), and of working through the tensions that have built up. The development dilemma with an asymmetrical initial situation, especially in the conflict of the highly industrialised countries with the global South, requires economic interdependence with the aim of integrating peripheries that have been disengaged (or are at risk of being disengaged). In the case of symmetrical relations of international-economic interdependence, coordination dilemmas are easier to deal with.

In the future, ecological interdependence will become increasingly important with regard to the ecology dilemma. The main issue here is the shift from political actions based on short-termism and particular interests to long-termism and a generally valid orientation towards the common good in the responsible regulatory frameworks.

These three dilemmas can overlap and reinforce each other through synergetic effects. Tasks of one area can thus be translated into others. Due to the ecological task, for example, economic interdependence will result in sanctioning environmentally damaging behaviour with economic means and rewarding environmentally friendly behaviour. Or climate changes (floods, drought and desertification) or excessive poverty in developing countries lead to violent conflicts and migration flows that must be addressed in security regimes (e.g. realised through the organisational structure of the UN). In the course of the ever increasing politicisation of societies, on the one hand through a rapid networking of the world through communication (international transfer of good, capital and technology, tourism), and on the other hand through constant

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processes of literacy, urbanisation and global acculturation ("westernisation"<sup>34</sup>), an institutionalisation of coordination is therefore necessary for all areas and beyond. On a global scale, we can therefore speak of an institutional interdependence that stands above the dilemmas (*security, development, ecology*) and connects the areas with each other. This is about creating reliability of expectations, transparency, stabilisation of interactions and other cooperation advantages. In order for such structures to do justice to their task, they need to be grounded in a common basis of values, which in the first place – in addition to the pressure of problems – advances a regulation of global relations. Without a "common language" (figuratively speaking), a process of cooperation and coordination is not possible. This is called normative-moral interdependence by Senghaas, which also has an influence on all dilemmas (*security, development, ecology*). Therefore, this interdependence can be seen as the top of the pyramid in the graph. The normative-moral interdependence has the task of ensuring a "common language" and maintaining the exchange about values and terminology. Since there is also a coordination dilemma in this area (challenge of universalism against particularism, globalism against regionalism), institutional interdependence is accordingly to be seen as a central task in the centre of gravity of the pyramid. The turn to the social world indicates that the coordination problem will be increasingly difficult to handle in the future.

As a result, one can state, that hegemony may build up in situations of known political dilemma situation. We can count – depending on available resources – four affinities for political-societal hegemonies: the security dilemma, the economy dilemma, the ecology dilemma, the values dilemma, and the coordination dilemma. These spheres are mainly prone to hegemonial structures. In the next chapter, the relationship of hegemony and societal transformations will be discussed.

### **4. The role of hegemony within societal transformations**

Hegemony is ultimately linked to the state respectively its elite. Without resorting to a developmental genesis of the state in this paper, the construction "state", whose modern form has crystallised since the 18th century, can certainly be seen as an accumulation point in global cultural history. In the political and academic debate, calls for the end of the state or statehood have been increasing for some time, brought about by international developments and *globalisation*. Even Carl Schmitt with his intractable political theory postulated as early as 1963 in his preface to the "Concept of the Political" (in a new edition of his 1932 writing) that "this highlight of European form and occidental rationalism" is being dethroned (Schmitt 1963). As a core component of many definitions, one can name the state as a special kind of organisation, with the property of securing the existence of a large social entity.<sup>35</sup> With these procedural events,

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<sup>34</sup> Laue (1987: 3) understands the term "westernisation" as follows: "For the first time in world history, this world-revolutionary process of westernisation has brought all the peoples of the world close together and forced them to cooperate, completely independently of their earlier cultural developments and also without taking into account their ability – or inability – to cooperate peacefully. In a very short time, essentially within half a century, all were pressed, often against their will, into a uniform development whose rules were set by a small minority called 'the West' (...). The result is that today and in the future, the development of the world can only be imagined as development within a 'Western framework'".

<sup>35</sup> So, this is how Helmuth Plessner's statement can be understood: "The state is a procedure and not a substance" (Plessner 1981: 115).

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statehood can therefore also be characterised as a specific performance action particular for its population (cf. Thomas 1998: 276). This description makes it respectively characteristic and similar to hegemonial structures. Thus, state functions as hegemonial structures can be numerated by the following (cf. Carey 2020):

- Continuous legitimisation of statehood (e.g. state people, possibly constitution, god, dynasty) and establishment or maintenance of a monopoly of authority;
- Formation of territoriality with the outflow of internal sovereignty to constitute the people of the state and the effect of external sovereignty as a protective and security function for the people of the state with the consequence of a de-privatisation of violence;
- In cooperation with an independent judiciary, ultimate regulatory competence and the right of final decision, with the aim of establishing a normative-political and normative-social regulatory function;
- Building up the confidence of the people of the state in the problem-solving abilities, the future viability of the state and in the functionality of political processes and administrations;
- Provision of public good and services or protection against typical risks: illness, unemployment, old age, restricted or suppressed coping with everyday life and other structural inequalities (disability, poverty).

In the previous sections, we analysed the “mechanism” of hegemony. Coming up, we will focus on hegemony by looking on the world society, the state and economic system.

### **4.1 Model of socio-economic development in a dynamic world society**

The social development of societies can be described by using the following model. This approach, in conjunction with the International Social Science Council (ISSC) transformation matrix applied below, can show that simultaneous, cumulative shifts of an n-dimensional attractor system "world society" exist with chaotic dynamic consequential effects (see Fig. 6):



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nationalism/cosmopolitanism, autocracy/plebiscitary state models, "all-party governments"/populism) or **intermittency** (constant change from periodic to chaotic behaviour, e.g. the continuous change from economic crisis to growth and business cycles, or in meteorology, e.g. the change from extreme weather to stable omega weather). Chaos research shows that the various non-linear systems that form the basis for these kinds of processes each have specific attractors. These can either be specific thresholds that realise a so-called phase transition or induce a convergence of diverse "movements" that tend towards a centre or several common centres. Therefore, in this modelling we can speak of an n-dimensional attractor system.

Ultimately, we find cumulative phase transitions in the entire system: "population/growth" (and demographic change, individualisation processes [cf. Charim 2018]); equally significant changes in the sub-factors: accelerating "climate change", "resources/energy" (massive consumption of fossil energies versus (still scarce) regenerative energy sources), "technology" (digitalisation and miniaturisation), "capital" (shift to a virtual economic system); serious degradation or devaluation of the natural "bases of life": water, air, temperature, soil cultivation and food chains (and destruction of biodiversity); resulting in the reduction of "carrying capacities" in the regions; "migration" (with the beginning of a new form of migration: subsistence migration [see Carey 2018c]); "conflicts" (significant increase in ethnic and civil society forms of conflict since the beginning of the 1990s (see Carey 1999); significant increase in racism and xenophobia [cf. Ther 2019]); "established monopoly of authority" (shift of the omnipotent state of the 19th/20th century to the debt state at the end of the 20th/early 21st century [cf. Streeck 2015 and Willke 2001, 1996]); and "intensity of production": qualitative change in the good market and the labour market (cf. Reckwitz 2019a and 2019b) (increasing precarious employment via mini-jobs, reduction of core workforces, characteristic changes in employment biographies, restrictions in occupational vertical mobility, and overall social impoverishment tendencies up to the middle class [in contrast to the very wealthy strata] [cf. 'Bundesregierung 2017, '5. Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' or Otte 2020: 175ff.]). The significant changes in all factors and the clear crossing of obviously critical threshold values can be very well understood and plausibilised with this model. All these evident factor changes, which systemically interact cumulatively, lead to the conclusion that this global situation probably has a historically unprecedented transformation potential.

Using the ISSC transformation matrix with the axes "national/global" and "slow, gradual/fast, catalytic", the transformation potential can be visualised and confirmed once again (see Fig. 7; cf. Brown et al. 2013: 102ff.).

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


Fig. 7: Transformation matrix of the ISSC - the national component applied to Germany (own representation)

There is increasing evidence that the current economic system (even with the prophecy of the end of capitalism [see e.g. Mason 2018]) is changing into a revolutionary system by transnational interdependencies, shifts in the economic base and also global threats: the rise of militarisation, economic financing crises, ecological threats (pandemics, climate change, destruction of the basis of life), the struggle for cultural sovereignty and the accumulation of ideologies (in the scientific business performing as well), information explosions of fake news and false "messages" heavily affect-laden with negative emotions. With certainly resounding effects on the common good economy, which we can observe for some time now. The so-called economisation of the social is only one aspect. This also includes the increase in financing obstacles of social services: due to ever stronger bank financing; solely project-related financing of innovative ideas without follow-up financing options possible; ever lower graded professional staff; "outsourcing" of essential elements of social services to "volunteers". Based on the above, it is evident that the *welfare state* is in a crucial transitional phase. In any case, for the author, there are two particular events in the recent past that have had a comprehensive political, economic and cultural impact on European societies: the overcoming of the "iron border" in Europe (1989/1990) and the collapse of some US banks, first and foremost Lehman Brothers Bank on 15 September 2008 (Carey 2019; Rödder 2015). In the first case, these events radically dissolved old structures; in the second case, they revealed the weakness of the economic system and yet brought about the restoration of old structures - which will probably turn out to be one of the great political mistakes in this transitional period in the future. For at the present time, the states of the global North are in an even worse position than they were at the time of the 2008 financial crisis. "Lessons learned" cannot be said for the European states or the OECD states – just as little as in political emergency management in the pandemic, etc.

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This volatile situation is especially prone for hegemonial developments, on many levels so to speak.

**4.2 Evolutionary steps of state functions: hegemonial phases from the territorial state to the denizen-state**

If one tries to create umbrella terms for governmental performance points, then they could be grouped under three categories: territorial State, confessional State and the welfare State. These terms can also be derived from Georg Jellinek's well-known definition: a state is a social entity whose constituent features are a territory surrounded by borders (state territory), a group of people residing on it as a core population (state people), and a state power ruling on this territory (Jellinek 1900; 2nd ed. 1905: 381-420; 3rd ed. 1914: 394-434). A "people"-state conceptualised by the author could also be considered as a post-industrial utopia (see table 1).

characteristic of definition	state territory	state power	people of the state	utopia: state of human beings
<b>shape</b>	territorial state	constitutional state	welfare state	denizen state
<b>function</b>	border security, development of the public amenities	societal order and security	products and services of public accommodation	securing of the lebensraum
<b>political attractors</b>	cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism (imperialism)	monopoly of authority vs. liberal rights of freedom	corporate friendly policy vs. social policy for private households	everyday life vs. churchyard peace
<b>societal cleavages</b>	massive migration vs. totalitarian society resp. dysfunctionality of public amenities	autocratic rule vs. private violence	state budgeting and abatement	destruction of the livelihood

Table 1: Conceptions of state functions (own representation)

With different steps, hegemonial phases can be categorised: The function of the territorial state is to secure borders and develop the functioning of public amenities. The functional focus of the constitutional state is the establishment of a social order (which includes political structures, but also the market) and the protection and security of the population. If one looks at the political attractors in the territorial state, they oscillate between a cosmopolitan understanding of the state and nationalism (in the case of expansionist efforts: imperialism). One can find strong cleavages

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in the territorial state either in the phenomenon of a massive migration (whereby massive should not be understood in absolute numbers, but in relative, socio-psychological relationships, namely how immigration [or the increase in refugees] is perceived subjectively [or collectively] by the observers). The other extreme of a conflict scenario would be the realisation of a closed society like the former GDR. In addition, a cleavage would exist in the territorial state if the public amenities in a society do not exist or are barely functional. This could also include the former GDR or – in the global South – e.g. the sub-Saharan zone. The political attractors in the form of a constitutional state oscillate between a rigid established monopoly of authority like a dictatorship (e.g. North Korea), and an opposite pole that excessively realises personal freedom rights (the USA could be counted among this type of political attractor). From this the cleavages follow in the first side autocratic rule (see Turkey, Russia) and on the other side in the opposite pole the authorisation or at least toleration of privatised violence (as here, too, the USA can be mentioned again, where gun ownership is a fundamental right of US citizens according to their constitution).

A look at the welfare state shows the following derived characteristics: The function of the welfare state is the provision of public good and services up to institutions of protection against the typical risks of life already mentioned above. In our view, the political attractors oscillate between an allocation and distribution policy favouring corporations and, on the other hand, promoting private households. If we look at European social policies in particular countries from a historical perspective, we find exactly the corresponding welfare state models (and their corresponding parties). The major cleavage in the welfare state, as already mentioned, is state budgeting and the economic challenge of ensuring budgetary balance as far as possible (which, however, is in direct contrast to the functional requirements of the territorial state, with the danger that, for example, investments in infrastructure are not made (as in Italy, for example, but also in Germany). It is precisely state budgeting that is of eminent importance for the maintenance of a wide range of social services, most of which are financed by public grants, and the cohesion in a society. "As far as the financing of the social sector is concerned, the extent of the difficulties involved is essentially dependent on the development of employment and economic growth within the respective political area within which financing and services are decided" (Kaufmann 2000: 48).

Last but not least, the author formulates a utopian deduction: Should the above mentioned *ecologisation* calculus actually become virulent in the face of increasing human suffering, constant flooding, continuous sea-level rise, serious changes in climate zones and further desertification, dwindling freshwater resources (e.g. lowering of groundwater levels, increasing soil yield losses, rising air pollution, further spread of diseases and energy shortages, then, in an optimistic view, we can believe a new quality of state coming to existence by taking human rights seriously and nationality will (hopefully) no longer play a role in the future. This type of state could be called a denizen state (see again table 1). The term *denizen* stands for the inhabitant (also animal, plant) of a region – detached from his nationality. The function of the denizen state would be to secure the lebensraum. The political attractors here would be the positively occupied habitat versus a negative "churchyard peace". The main political agenda in a denizen state, signifying a social cleavage, would be the threat of the destruction of livelihoods. The political agenda could

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be either to rely on technology to compensate for the worst consequences of ecological damage, or to shift to a new ecologically sustainable form of society.

The development in modern times has produced the state in its present form and functionally differentiated it in many ways: into a territorial state, a constitutional state and a welfare state. The cleavages mentioned above developed around specific attractors in relation with different forms of the state. Hegemonial structures transform themselves by the evolutionary development of governmental functions. In the territorial state, hegemony is raised by grounds, resources, and population (e.g. imperialism); in the constitutional state, hegemony becomes a reality by monopolizing opinions (e.g. mobilizing votes) and culture (e.g. media imperialism, social media); in the welfare state, hegemony is established by demand orientated economic policies, social services, and social benefits. In the denizen-state, hegemonial structures will probably be secured by more or less "healthy" ecological lebensraum, which are able to be encapsulated.

This line of thought will be specified economically in the next section. The author starts from the following thesis: The European welfare state respectively the welfare state models are always a reflection of the economic, or more precisely the capitalist system, which has been and still is globally the most widespread economical form for centuries now.

### **4.3 Economic transformation fosters hegemonial structures**

Since, as will be briefly shown, the capitalist system has changed over the last centuries, the welfare state – and social services as part of the welfare state - has changed analogously. These transformations are shown historically with a special focus on Germany (in the following Carey 2017: 10ff.).

With regard to the development of market economy systems, one can historically reconstruct various waves of development of "capitalism" up to the early 21st century. Azmanova (cf. 2014: 577ff.) describes a total of three major phases: "**Liberal capitalism**" (from the 18th century to ca. 1945) was particularly characterised by massive industrialisation (in Western Europe). In this first phase, capital developed through an intensive accumulation of labour - with effects up to the present day. The first regional labour markets emerged from the 16th century onwards: North Sea coast, Paris area, Madrid and Castile, coasts from Catalonia to Provence, Po Valley to the Apennines, southern Tuscany, Rome, Lazio and Corsica. The experience of the world economic crisis of 1929-1932 ended this first end of laissez-faire (in liberal capitalism).

The next episode can be described as the formation or institutional coming together of state, capital and labour. The further development of capitalism is called "**organised capitalism**", which historically found different forms: the New Deal (President Franklin D. Roosevelt) in the USA, industrial democracy in Sweden and fascism in continental Europe (cf. Dörre 2016: 357f.). After the Second World War, this form of capitalism is also referred to as **social liberal or neo-liberal capitalism**. The hallmark of this phase is social partnership or corporatism (cf. also Streeck 2015: 49ff.; 2011: 137-167). It led to a social or socio-political amalgamation of state, capital and labour. "Elements of a neo-corporatist institutionalisation of class interests, the centralisation of trade unions and collective bargaining, and an economic policy concentrated between state, business

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and labour were found even in countries like Iceland" (Streeck 2006: 14). In Germany, the re-emergence of "organised capitalism" began after the Second World War with the development of the social market economy.

In the current phase of development, we have been in a "**disorganised capitalism**" (cf. Offe 1985: 6) or in "**retro-liberalism**" since the 1980s (cf. Carey 2017). This led – reinforced by the current wave of globalisation of trade, finance, transnational actors and supranational organisations, media – to the dissolution of the mediation mechanisms to the factor labour and, as a countermovement, to strengthened (inter)relations between state and capital (cf. Streeck 2015).

The development of the welfare state and social services can be traced quite analogously. The term *welfare state* (or *welfare capitalism*) refers to a concept in which the state assumes general control of economic and social processes and frees up a considerable part of its resources to meet the demand for equality of life chances in the dimensions of income security, education, health and housing. "A modern welfare state is one that compensates for the disadvantages of larger groups in the economic reproduction process (the old, the sick, the handicapped, the unemployed, etc.) by providing money, material and/or personal services in education, health and social welfare, whether from public budgets or through insurance systems financed by contributions, that guarantees the social participation of all citizens and – by legal entitlement – ensures that no one is excluded from a general increase in prosperity (social justice)" (Butterwegge 1999: 15f.). The decisive point here is that "[...] social policy cannot be separated from the social relations of production, ownership and power. Under capitalism, it promotes the reproduction of the commodity labour power and pacifies dissatisfied masses or revolutionary movements" (ibid.). Thus, the welfare state is always a reflection of its social and economic mode of organisation. As already stated, essential phases of the *welfare* state can be traced with the transformation of the economic or capitalist system.

The same applies to the development of social work. In the Middle Ages, poverty was considered to be God's will. The classical economists in the 18th and 19th centuries also understood poverty to be a natural law: there will always be poverty - with or without the market, that was the idea shared by many (cf. Noll 2010: 255ff.). Therefore, in the classical works, there is no real engagement to be found with the question of poverty.<sup>38</sup> The first forms of social work in the modern era were a reflection of the theoretical conceptions of society and practical structures of order at that time. Social work in Europe was carried out primarily on the basis of Christian mercy and charity on a voluntary or honorary basis (cf. Müller 2013: 11ff.). The first "penitentiaries and workhouses" emerged during this phase. These "workhouses" were also called "sites of early capitalist production" (Marzahn/Ritz 1984: 15f.). It is not surprising that the Netherlands was considered a model for this. Due to its geographical location and the expansion of its international trade relations, a first, distinct and nationwide early capitalist economic order developed in this area. Besides this 'closed help for the poor', the first branch of social work actually developed in Europe in the 19th century through the use of volunteers ('conservator of the poor' [Armenpfleger]

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<sup>38</sup> One exception is found in Ricardo. A perversion of this idea of poverty was found in so-called "Social Darwinism" at the end of the 19th century.

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or 'helper for welfare' [Wohlfahrtshelfer]), e.g. in the Elberfeld system (cf. Müller, loc. cit.). Social work in the USA, as the engine of economic dynamism, was also based on two pillars, or rather three pillars: (voluntary) neighbourly help (in cities and in the settlements), the (male-dominated) municipal administration of the cities in the East and civic engagement (mainly carried out by women), e.g. via the Hull House in Chicago<sup>39</sup> or in various *charity organisations*. The development of the welfare state can be described as "**social bureaucratisation**" with the emergence of the territorial states with its administration in the 19th century (in the phase of liberal capitalism; economic process: formation of capital via accumulation of labour). This includes socio-legal developments such as compulsory schooling, labour protection rights, "regulation" of places of residence.

A new dimension at the end of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century led to comprehensive modelling by the state in the context of a stronger nationalisation of societies ("**social modelling**" in liberal capitalism). The prime example here is social legislation in Germany since the 1880s, which introduced the (first) social insurance schemes as part of the authoritarian state. Added to this (relatively late, but nevertheless) were the introduction of universal and equal suffrage, growth in labour law norms, regulation of maternity and child welfare, provision for war-affected persons and war survivors, allocation of housing and new benefit rights in the area of social security, education and health (cf. Gosewinkel 2016: 248f.). "The >social< as an argument and demand for needs became a 'ubiquitous idea' in the latent socio-economic permanent crisis of the interwar period, in that it [...] penetrated almost all areas of politics" (ibid.; see also Stolleis 2003: 127). As a consequence of this expansion of social rights (expansion of those entitled to benefits and expansion of benefits as well), a steep increase in the number of those entitled to support can be observed (cf. Gosewinkel loc. cit.: 249).<sup>40</sup> It was precisely in this phase of **social modelling** – as a precursor in the USA and then in Germany – that a huge push towards professionalisation of social work emerged, which led to the transformation of voluntary work (especially home visitors) into a professional (and paid) activity (initially without specific training) (cf. Müller op. cit.: 22ff.). The best-known protagonists are Mary Richmond (in the USA) and Alice Salomon (in Germany), who forced the first professional training for women by setting up the Social Women's School in Berlin-Schöneberg. Parallel to this, via the youth movements in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century (e.g. that of the "Wandervögel"), the group developed as a pedagogical concept within the framework of the modelling phase (ibid.: 68ff.). At the same time, the youth welfare office ("Jugendamt") and youth relief became established in Germany. The period after the First World War was a boom phase of the European welfare state through the expansion of social legislation and large welfare programmes, with which a new network of services for the public was established (see also Ritter 1991; Eichenhofer 2007: 37-67). This did not end in Germany with the National Socialist racial state. The expansion of the welfare state continued after 1933. It produced numerous new benefit entitlements in areas relevant to racial policy, such as family policy and for groups of people who were important to the regime, and expanded the social security budget overall (Stolleis 2003: 192, 198f., 202). The

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<sup>39</sup> With the women who founded and funded Hull House: Ellen Gates Starr, Alice Hamilton, Mary Rozet Smith, Julia Lathrop, Florence Kelley, Louise de Koven Bowen and Jane Addams.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. in Great Britain, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

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formed youth organisations (with racial ideologically thinking) also increased in importance (cf. Müller op. cit.: 77ff. and 100ff.).

The next episode (actually in **organised capitalism** or **neo-liberal capitalism**<sup>41</sup>) in the post-war era is the "**social-ethical standardisation**" of the welfare state, which is characterised by a constitutional bond between social goals and economic goals or by a notion of social justice as a normative guiding idea. The social goals in Germany are derived from Article 20 (1) of the Grundgesetz (democratic and social federal state) and Article 28 (1) sentence 1 of the Grundgesetz (social constitutional state). This implies the demand for social justice as the guiding principle of all state measures with respect for human dignity (Article 1 (1) GG) (Hesselberger 1990: para. 18). At the European level, the economic policy normative version of a "European social market economy" also applies, which is based on EU primary law according to Article 3 (3) Treaty on European Union [TEU] (Europe is a social market economy) and in particular Article 36 [Charter of Fundamental Rights] in conjunction with the anchoring in Article 6 TEU. The state objective is the establishment of social security within the framework of the constitutional legality. The (German) welfare state must therefore ensure socially just and secure living conditions for its citizens, subject to financial viability. A differentiation of welfare state models takes place in this temporal section. The existing modern welfare state models are divided into three categories: social democratic-egalitarian, competition-oriented-liberal or conservative-corporatist (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990: 26-29). The following elements can be named as characteristics or achievements of this **social-ethical standardisation**: Social market economy, corporatism, co-determination, participation, social performance rights in substantiated form as enforceable individual rights and social promotion. As a result of the National Socialist atrocities, the four "D's" were translated into the well-known measures and actions during this period: Denazification, Demilitarisation, Decartelisation and Democratisation. In this sense, the methodology of social work with (social) group work/group pedagogy with the help of the concept of the 'Jugendhof' became very important in the coming reconstruction (cf. Müller op. cit.: 120ff.). In this phase, the idea existed that the "new" image of society should overcome the traditional opposition between the individual and society (corresponding to the US-American social group work). In later periods, which can also be described by comprehensive individualisation processes (since the 1970s), this gap between individual and society become more and more significant up to the present time. The psychological-methodological climax of the so-called "psychoboom" confirms this episode (ibid.: 271ff.).

In the current phase of "**social economisation**" within the framework of **disorganised capitalism** or **retro-liberalism** since the 1980s and 1990s, we find the beginning of the restructuring of the welfare state. The formation of the debt state<sup>42</sup> and fiscal state, with the aim of consolidating state finances, is to be achieved through the privatisation of public tasks by transferring state functions back to society, more precisely to the market economy, to a greater

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<sup>41</sup> In economics, the term neo-liberalism already refers to the further development of classical liberal capitalism into a social market economy in the 1940s to 1950s (cf. Rödder 2015: 48; Noll 2010: 221ff.). The now inflationary use of the term neo-liberalism for special economic measures from the end of the 1970s onwards is historically and semantically incorrect. Cf. in detail Rödder 2015: 47ff. who shows how fuzzy and meaningless the term neo-liberalism is.

<sup>42</sup> Since 1974 until today, OECD countries have accumulated massive debt (see also OECD Outlook 2017).

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or lesser extent – from old-age provision to health care (illness, nursing), school education, training and employment. As a matter of fact, the "reduction of the state share" corresponds with increasing anti-egalitarian distribution effects (cf. Streeck 2015: 152f.).<sup>43</sup> The new (yet centuries-old liberal) vision is that of a "state cut back to guarantee market relations". The anticipated future is "that of a secular implosion of the social contract of capitalist democracy in transition to an international consolidation state committed to fiscal discipline" (ibid.: 206). The following elements can be mentioned here as characteristics of the present form of the welfare state: Social budgeting, dominance of client orientation and (social) market principles, social responsabilisation (cf. Lutz 2015: 173ff.) and rise of common good economies. In the development of methods, the concept of social space orientation and (somewhat later) social networking now emerged, case management was imported from the USA (late 1980s and early 1990s) as an innovative concept, and the new courses of study in public management or public economy were curricularly conceived and established at universities. The exuberant reasoning at the present is: to what extent can the available resources (money, personnel, time) for the different fields of social work (understood as a special service and as a scarce commodity) be led to a better allocation and to a better efficient/effective management. The answers so far have been (and partly still are) a more intensive implementation of "business management" in the fields of social practice. However, it is fatally forgotten that the relationship work between the professional and the client is based on other premises. The classical business management doctrine is based on the concept of the customer. However, it is evident that in the social and health sector, that there are essential differences to the classic customer relationship and that the client in the domain of social work is precisely not a customer (cf. Carey 2016b: 1ff.). Furthermore, business management doctrine is calibrated on the management of services via the value orientation (namely the market price); in social work, in contrast to the former, the (effective) management takes place via the benefit orientation. These main contradictory differences clearly show that the direct application of classical business management studies to management of social practice is a misguided approach.

After recognising the transformational and dynamical power of contemporary society and economic system, another example of social hegemony should be looked upon in the next chapter.

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<sup>43</sup> See trends in income inequality (Gini coefficients) at OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty; OECD Factbook 2010: Country Indicators, OECD Factbook Statistics.

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### **5. A socio-philosophical review about social hegemony**

Hegemony is to be seen in social relationships respectively social structures as well. It is the cultural economisation, which takes place for three decades, and functions as a social hegemony for the social enterprises.

#### **5.1 The *cultural economisation* as example for social hegemony**

The author had analysed political entities from a historical-analytical perspective (Carey 1999: 31ff.). In this context three particular rationality or **thought-calculi** could be identified that had shaped the cultural development of humanity (at least through the oldest calculus) for a long time: *militarisation* or *evasion*, *economisation*, *ecologisation* (ibid.). These rational meta-calculi stand on the one hand for a continuity of cultural development, but also for the transcultural emergence in thinking (cf. also Wilber 2001 on the topic of 'rationality'). Furthermore, the author analysed transformation factors and presented that the development of capitalism is now in its (for the time being) third phase of 'disorganised capitalism', 'keystroke capitalism', 'retro-capitalism' (cf. Carey 2017/2019), 'virtual economy' (Albert, Brock, Hessler, Menzel, Neyer 1999) or '*post-industrial* economy' in the global North (cf. Reckwitz 2019a: 135ff.), and social work and its organisations (with four phases: Social bureaucratisation [from the 18th century to the end of the 19th century], Social modelling [from the 1890s to 1945], Social-ethical standardisation [from the 1949s to the 1990s], Social economisation [from the 1990s]) have been and are being influenced accordingly (Carey 2017/2019, op. cit.).

In terms of cultural history and anthropology, we can distinguish between two human *logics*: the **logic of afficiation and attribution of value (valorisation)**, and **the logic of the rational** (hereafter cf. Carey 1999/2016; with minimal borrowings from Reckwitz 2019a: 29ff.) (see Fig. 8). The latter domain contains those things that are primarily evaluated according to the criteria of the functional and the useful: e.g. organisation, supply, technology, economy, or territory, when it comes to the environment (also 'nature' or modern ecology). This domain can also be described with the umbrella term '**worth**'. The first domain is about our sensations, feelings and above all our identity. The entities placed here are community, region, good (such as art, literature), our individual personality and – relevant to our environment – 'social space'. All this can be headed with '**values**'. Thus, we have two *worlds* interacting *in us*, *with us* and *about us*.

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


Fig. 8: Anthropological preconditions: The world of two *logics* (own representation)

The linking 'mechanism' of these two worlds has not yet been properly understood. It is plausible that the "lebensraum" approach could be understood as the hinge for both worlds and that in the case of 'spontaneous' patterns of order, it is highly likely to develop via *reciprocity*<sup>44</sup> (in the case of established orders, developments take place primarily via *accumulations* that take place and are controlled via *secondary* and *tertiary rules*<sup>45</sup>). It can be equally stated that the interdependence of both domains is to be understood dynamically. Here, the following 'motivations' (or *social value principles* [cf. Tool 2001/1979]) provide social driving forces of human-cultural developments:

- 1) primarily originating from the *domain of values*:
  - a. securing existence,
  - b. the worry/to worry (cf. Wendt 2018),
  - c. social placement (internal member behaviour of groups);
- 2) primarily originating from the *domain of worth* (related to behaviour of external member groups):
  - a. cooperation:  
it can arise on the basis of trust, but also on the basis of rationality calculations.

<sup>44</sup> *Reciprocity* was investigated by Mauss through the action of the 'gift' and introduced by him as a concept. By this he means neither an economic exchange (and thinking) to be regarded as an early form, nor altruistic giving. Confirming our argumentation, Mauss makes it clear that the reciprocity concretised in the 'gift' "firstly encompasses all dimensions of the social: the political, religion, the economy, law, morality, art, etc." Secondly, gift exchange encompasses the whole of society: all individuals and subgroups are affected and engaged. Thirdly, it is total because it occurs in every society - archaic as well as modern" (Adloff/Mau 2005: 13).

<sup>45</sup> See footnote 11.

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However, the basis of trust is not meant here, since this is based on the logic of affiliation in a group and is covered by the above-mentioned social driving forces. The 'cooperation' named here, understood as a rational procedure, is therefore located in the worth area,

b. competition:

This social-philosophical point can also be found in Tool (2001/1979), who, however, only starts from these three principles, which, are compatible with the above as meta-concepts: *instrumental effectiveness, continuity of human life, noninvidious re-creation of community.*

In the 1990s, conditions for non-violent cohesion of political entities at both national and international level were studied (cf. Carey 1999: 271). As a result, four constitutive spheres emerged which are necessary for a perpetuation of (peaceful) entities: the **moral system** and the moral person (constitution: recognition qua being human), the **ethical system** and the ethical person (constitution: identity development and the protection of the self through law), the **political system** and the political person as citizen (constitution: autonomy to be able to act as author of rules) and the **legal system** and the legal person (constitution: reason as addressee of law and to protect the ethical and the moral person). What is crucial here is that entities need these four spheres to constitute themselves and that they link the world of *values* (affiliation and valorisation) with the world of *worth* (rationality, functionality and utility): the ethical, juridical, political and moral systems project into both worlds and intertwine *in* and *through the lebensraum* – as named above via the principle of *reciprocity* (see Fig. 9).

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


Fig. 9: The linking of the two worlds by the ethical system, the juridical system, the political system, and the moral system (own representing)

These conditions apply equally to established orders or spontaneous orders that are or should be made permanent. The services of social work and their theoretical foundation (regardless of whether they are provided as gainful employment or as voluntary work) come - historically seen - clearly from the *realm of values* and led in the course of the professionalisation of social work to the *realm of worth*. The corresponding organisations of funding providers are equally placed between the two worlds and, as empirically proven,<sup>46</sup> make an important contribution to the cohesion of a society (see Fig. 10). The social organisations created, on the other hand, are more on the side of *worth* than on the side of *values* for historical-cultural and systemic-economic reasons, which is known to lead to a dilemma for the management of these organisations. In any case, the juridical system, the political system and the ethical or moral system have a constitutive effect in these organisations and influence the respective management system.

<sup>46</sup> For example, studies on conflict resolution in African countries show: where social (possibly traditional) structures exist, conflicts are less violent (cf. pars-pro-toto Matthies 2004: 225ff.).

**Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek**




Fig. 10: Anthropological preconditions: The world of two logics - **with location of social work** and the public economy (own representation)

These considerations are important for the current understanding of the common good economy. As already explained, capitalism has been changing since the 1970s/1980s (towards *disorganised capitalism* or *retro-capitalism*). These transformations, exacerbated by the global financial crisis (of 2008), are having a blatant impact on social work services, particularly on social work funding (see Carey 2017/2019). Structural shifts are reshaping the framework of the common good economy in several steps. Reckwitz analyses this 'economisation of the social' in terms of a 'culturalisation'<sup>47</sup> and means by this a more intensive *valorisation* and *afficiation* of good in all dimensions of the living space. "Culture as a sphere of valorisation dynamics expands in late modernity because more and more things - beyond the question of utility, interests and function - are sucked into the cultural game of valorisation and devaluation" (Reckwitz 2019a: 35). And: "[S]ince a post-industrial, immaterial economy has moved to the centre of economic activity, since knowledge and economy, culture and economy, emotion and economy have been visibly linked" (op. cit.: 201), "an expansive economisation of the social has been taking place since the 1980s" (op. cit.: 193). "The cultural-symbolic and the emotional" migrate "more and more into the economy" (op. cit.: 177). Instead of speaking of *culturalisation*, the author uses the more precise term (from Reckwitz) of a *cultural economisation* of the 'social' – with the effect that the 'social' and its services have been increasingly *commodified* for several decades.<sup>48</sup> The point is that the common good economy and its social services experienced an expansion of the world of *worth* (of the rational, the functional) until the end of the 20th century – quasi as a residual wave of modern and *Fordist* industrialisation (since the 19th century). In the common good economy of the 21st century, however, the late-modern, *post-industrial* wave of culturalisation is now arriving – intensified by the global financing crises and the crisis of public financing (cf. Streeck 2013), i.e.

<sup>47</sup> "Since the 1970s [...] Western-style societies have begun to culturalise themselves" (Reckwitz 2019a: 29ff.; here: 35). See also Jameson's (1992) cultural analyses as the logic of postmodernism.

<sup>48</sup> The author had already described this in 1995/1999 with the calculation of economisation; this has been at work in Europe for several centuries (Carey 1999: 31ff.).

## Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek

the world of *values* (of affiliation and valorisation) has been moving strongly into the common good economy again for some time - but many 'experts' have not even noticed it (see Fig. 11).




Fig. 11: The *cultural economisation* of the common good economy (own representation)

### 5.2 The heterogeneous structure of social enterprises for the common good by *cultural economisation*

In the following section, the entire spectrum of social work enterprises is presented on the basis of Hayek-Carey's theory of the market process and 'spontaneous/established' patterns of order. Here, Rainer Forsthoff's concept of providence for existence with the sub-element of common welfare orientation is used additively as a common bracket (cf. Luthe 2017: 21ff.) to capture the broad production-like heterogeneity of common good economy enterprises.<sup>49</sup> A *catallaxy index* was developed by the author for this purpose in order to make this representation more analytical. Crucial for Hayek and North is that the cause of the market process lies mainly in the general limitedness and decentralisation of knowledge.<sup>50</sup>

*The question, who has the data to decide and to act, "led me, in part, to ask to whom were the data really given. To us, it was of course [given] to nobody. The economist assumes [the data] are given to him, but that's a fiction. In fact, there's no one who knows all the data or the whole process, and that's what led me*

<sup>49</sup> The different, legally shaped forms of enterprises belong above all to the category of 'established order'. Since much has already been written about these, the author spares himself a summary. More important in this context are the spontaneous orders.

<sup>50</sup> In this context, the author does not differentiate between 'information' and 'knowledge', although this distinction is significant in detail.

## Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek

in the thirties, to the idea that the whole problem was the utilization of information dispersed among thousands of people and not possessed by anyone" (Hayek 1994 [1937]: 147).

Spontaneous orders, unlike established orders, always emerge on the basis of decentralised knowledge (with the evolutionary principles of *self-coordination* and *self-control* [Markt 2007: 181]). That is why, Hayek conceived the market to be a spontaneous order. All common good enterprises can be classified according to the *catallaxie index*: for example, '0' means no coordination/control via 'decentralised knowledge' (e.g. prison or court structure) and, hence, is per se no longer a spontaneous order; '10' means coordination/control functions entirely via 'decentralised knowledge' (e.g. network organisation or Wikipedia). As antipodal criterion, one can look on the 'available single point knowledge' necessary for an established or to be established organisation: '0' means control/coordination only works via 'available single point knowledge'; '10' means control/coordination does not/barely work via 'available single point knowledge'.

Thus, the range of diverse common good productions with a focus on spontaneous orders (based on 2nd order *catallaxic* interlocking) can be categorised in the following overview (see Fig. 12).




Fig. 12: The spectrum of typical common good productions based on the 2nd order *catallaxie index* (decentralised control, decentralised knowledge) (own representation)

Thus, the common good economy (i.e. public economy) can be differentiated into 5 pillars with different modes of regulating: **public-judicial production** via the State, country and Municipalities (social work in administration), **community-oriented production** via providers (education, pedagogy, social work in municipal need-care structures), **market-oriented production** (social work in hospitals, in care and rehabilitation), **comrades economical**

## ***Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek***

**production** in social spaces (e.g. corporate social responsibility concepts, cooperatives) and **citizens economical production** (social voluntary work, voluntary services).<sup>51</sup> The *catallaxy index* with the criteria 'decentralised control' or 'decentralised knowledge' helps to sort and classify the different common good productions. In the case of public welfare productions, we only have a low index value, since here regulation respectively control takes place primarily via 'available single point knowledge'. Depending on whether the social administration works according to the Weberian bureaucracy model, the New Public Management model or the public governance model (cf. Tabatt-Hirschfeldt 2018), the *catallaxy value* amounts to 0-2. In the needs economy, we have a somewhat higher value of decentralised control/knowledge due to the differentiation into (welfare) associations (based on the principle of subsidiarity) and other social NPOs. The *catallaxy value* increases to 10 for self-organised cooperatives, social activities and networks, as the share of decentralised control and decentralised knowledge is greatest here. Hayek, as an economist, described market structures primarily as spontaneous organisation. Therefore, market-oriented production is found here in the broad and middle/upper field (5-8) – depending on which 'health products' are involved (e.g. high intensity care or wellness), to what extent the client is actually a patient (cf. Carey 2018b) and in which form of enterprise (non-stock corporation, capital company) production takes place. Since the dependence on 'established' organisations is greater here than in the area of social space management, this type of production does not receive the highest *catallaxy value*. Of course, it must be taken into account that in the public economy we do not have a 'pure' market that functions according to classic economic principles (guided by mere economic expediency), since the various forms of social work are merit-based (public) good that are predominantly publicly financed and not via the service recipients as with the classic customer (cf. Carey 2017: 1ff.).

This diagram shows the extent and intensity of spontaneous orders in the common good economy. Talking about established orders, we can state the following: Along with Hayek, Eisenstadt also assumes (indeed, he insists on this in the name of analytical progress) that a difference has to be maintained between a *structural differentiation*, i.e. "of the crystallisation of specific, organisationally distinct roles" (1998: 30) and a *symbolic social differentiation*, i.e. "the conception of ontological and social reality, and with an increasing orientation to some reality beyond the given one and with growing reflexivity and second order thinking" (ibid.), For Eisenstadt, the coupling of both spheres takes place via the symbolic level, which he calls 'elite functions' (ibid.: 31; cf. also Alexander, Colony 1989). Thus, the connections to established orders in the diagram (i.e. pars-pro-toto forms of organisation/companies<sup>52</sup>), since this is the only way to achieve higher and long-term stability,<sup>53</sup> are more or less strong. The highest *catallaxy values*

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<sup>51</sup> Objections could be raised that citizen economical production does not belong to the public economy because it does not include gainful activities and is not traded on the market. Thus, these activities per se would not belong to the public economy. The fact is, however, that if the special citizen economical production (e.g. family education, housekeeping and care work) were paid, this would have an economic impact in the form of a substantial increase in the gross domestic product. Cf. also the study by Roy/Ziemeck 2001. Or see also the following study in which the time expenditure of volunteers and voluntary helpers in France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Hungary and the USA was calculated. Here, they arrived at an equivalent of an additional 5 million full-time employees (Salamon, Anheier 1998: 15).

<sup>52</sup> As already said, the established orders are only referred to in this context and not presented separately.

<sup>53</sup> See chapter 2.

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(2nd order) in the common good economy with the criteria 'decentralised coordination/control' or 'decentralised knowledge' are possessed by market-oriented, comrade and citizen orientated productions. The advantages of spontaneous orders lie primarily in the optimal utilisation of distributed decentralised knowledge, which would not be possible via single point knowledge (cf. Förster 2015). In particular, they have the following strengths:

- 1) the creation of consensus,
- 2) a higher flexibility and variability in the services,
- 3) a faster provision of good, which in the best case are also valuable, and
- 4) a better connectivity (depending on the respective transaction costs incurred) through *action settings*.<sup>54</sup>

These advantages can hardly be provided by, for example, public authorities or similar organisations. A shortcoming of spontaneous' (as well as established) orders, however, is the fact that these order structures can be both good and bad orders – depending on the value standard (cf. Sen 2007: 29ff.). At this point, it is to highlight, that the market as such – in correspondence to the resource money – also has the disadvantage that it peripheralises people, excludes them and reinforces inequalities. It promotes the concentration and centralisation of capital resources on a few, thus constituting dependency relationships for many people (cf. Carey 1999: 36ff.) and it functions according to the "winner-take-all" or "winner-take-the-most" principle (cf. Frank, Cook 2010). Additionally, the market mechanism that should allegedly function in the forecast is latently based on very high and actually hardly to be found assumptions:

- 1) (fairly) equal resource endowment of the market participants and the respective suppliers to each other,
- 2) complete familiarity with the product-specific market and its good,
- 3) existing possibility of a 'competent' assessment of the quality of the market good, and
- 4) equality of the transaction costs for the market participants.

These conditions are hardly fulfilled in reality. Therefore, the statements of mainstream economics have to be put into relative perspective. It is therefore not surprising that the scientific literature likes to take (small) vegetable and fruit markets as best practice examples of market functioning!

So, in questions of evaluations of organisations and their developments, let alone in questions of the management and leadership of organisations, ethical values and norms are consequently obligatory. For this reason, Hayek occasionally referred to the principle of justice or fairness in his analyses. It is evident that the current *cultural economisation* has changed the framework

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<sup>54</sup> *Action settings* are the physical presence of actors and the co-presence of interaction partners in the context of an overlap with a material-physical world (e.g. via IT-supported networking, interfaces) in the sense of hybrid structures, such as workplaces or cafés (cf. Carey 2019: 125ff.).

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conditions for the management of social enterprises. This also means that the financing and production bases of **public judicial production** (budget economy), **community-oriented production** (demand economy), **market-oriented production** (market economy), **comrade economical production** (solidarity economy) and **citizen economical production** (exchange economy) will be overhauled with *cultural economisation*. As a result of this change – and this has also become clear for some time in current business management and socio-marketing concepts – the diverse regulation and steering modes of common good productions are changing into meta-criteria of *attractiveness* or *reputation* and *attention* or *recognition* of social work enterprises that transcend production types (see Fig. 13).




Fig. 13: Overhauling the modes of governance in the common good economy via *cultural economisation* (own representation)

What causes can be named for this *cultural economisation* in the common good economy for Germany and for the global North? Overall, three cumulative factors (bundles) can be identified:

- 1) **Transformation of the economic system into a 3rd form of capitalism:** further development of liberal capitalism (from the 16th century to the middle of the 20th century) via organised capitalism (from the middle of the 20th century to the 1970s/1980s) to 'disorganised capitalism' or globalised '*financialised* capitalism' with the special characteristic of a cultural and creditor capitalism.

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This results above all from the:

- a. **Shift in the economic basis from material good to immaterial good** through the massive increase in "knowledge good" and good with symbolic, experiential, aesthetic, media and ethical value. (cf. Bomsel 2010; Moulier-Boutang 2008; Bell 1973; Karpik 2011; Albert et al. 1999), and
  - b. **Shift to new private money creation structures and increase in public budget debt** (cf. e.g. Streeck 2015; Windolf 2005; Stehr 2001; Boltanski/Chiapelle 2003);
2. **Globalised production processes<sup>55</sup> and digitalisation of living spaces** (cf. Carey 2019; Carey 2018a, 2017, 2016): Massive change in everyday life and in our living worlds via globalisation effects and artificial hyperconnectivities;
3. **Multiple individualisation processes** (cf. Charim 2018):
- a. **First wave** of individualisation: establishing sameness through similarity [**homogenised subjects**]: In this phase, individuals are all thought of as equal, but also as part of a group. The development of ideas and the normative justification of human rights emerged in the 18th century (during the Enlightenment) and continues to have an impact today;
  - b. **Second wave** of individualisation: production of a singular personality [**authenticated subjects**]: Individuals reflect on their distinctive and unique ("claimed") identity and demand the living out of their own needs. Historically, one can refer to the new social movements in the 1960s: International Student Movements, Second Women's Movement, Civil Rights Movements, Peace Movements etc.;
  - c. **Third wave** of individualisation: experience of contingency (of identity that is also possible in another way) through the existential coexistence of plural life worlds [**pluralised subjects**]: since the 1990s, people have experienced a "minus identity" through a more pluralised society. People define themselves as different, as less whole, compared to other cultural (possibly ethnic) milieus. The individualised efforts go into this form of increased compensation for "minus identities". Characteristics of social action in this regard are the current *genderism* and sexual orientation movements, diversity movement, inclusion, but also folklorisation movements in all variants (up to the nationally exaggerated form).

These factors have a cumulative effect on the social base in general and on the common good economy in particular. Additionally, the argumentation for resilience factors of social enterprises

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<sup>55</sup> In contrast to earlier historical globalisation processes in antiquity and from the early modern period until the beginning of the 20th century, which were primarily global "(exchange)", exploitation or trade relations and minimally production transactions, the hallmark of today's globalisation is mainly a production and supply transaction (keyword: supply chain management) on the one hand and a media information and cultural distribution transaction on the other. Cf. Han 2005; Reckwitz 2019a: 29ff. In relation to globalisation and migration processes, see Carey 2018c.

## **Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek**

goes further on from this point of view. In the next section, the findings are used to explain and take stock of the special situation of the social enterprises and its current challenges.

### **5.3 Social enterprises in the focus of social hegemony**

A brief look at the current challenges will help us in a comparison to understand the structural change in the public economy. The current changes are sorted into the following clusters: client, service provider, national economy and political-legal framework (see Fig. 14). On the client side, this representation makes it transparent that *cultural economisation* is clearly driving social and individual changes: an increase in "new" life models, a different attitude of entitlement and expectation towards (social) services, changes due to demographic change, structural change on the labour market, decades-long increase in chronic, non-conferrable diseases and shifts in social inequality structures, as this has also been presented in the Fifth Poverty and Wealth Report of the Federal Government (2017).




Fig. 14: Clustered naming of socio-economic changes in Germany (own representation)

On the other side are the service providers, who mainly have to deal with structural-long-term challenges: Shortage of qualified staff, rising operating costs (e.g. caused by an increase in energy costs), intense competitive situations with the compulsion to constantly deliver innovations, and strong structural change in the financing of operations and services. A look at

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the 'national economy' reveals massive changes in real wage development (due to constant systemic and financing crises, e.g. real estate crisis in the USA with global impact, bank insolvencies, crises due to European communitarisation (Greece), environmental problems (plastic waste increase) via a mass-oriented agricultural economy and consequences of climate change (droughts, sea level rise etc.) and pandemic(s). Thus, a continuous indebtedness of all OECD countries and a "crisis of public financing" can be stated (cf. Streeck 2015; Carey 2019). For decades, social insurances have shown precarious and unsustainable financing. This further leads to the fact that the socio-political-legal conditions (also for decades) show no stability. The examples given of massive changes in social legislation do indeed originate from Germany. However, the author assumes that the above statements are also relevant for the OECD-countries as well.

## Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek

For further analysis, the author has designed an impact model for social enterprises (see Fig. 15):




Fig. 15: Impact model for social enterprises (own representation)

In this model, one can clearly see the two impact pillars that have an effect on social enterprises: (1) socio-demographic and socio-economic factors, as well as (2) socio-cultural factors. These two impact pillars can per se legitimate the Hayek-Carey approach to *cultural economics* in the common good economy. Both have an interdependent and direct impact on the **resources** of a social enterprise **and** on the prevailing **motivations** of the people (staff, members, volunteers, other stakeholders) revealed by corresponding actions. Empirical leadership theory emphasises by numerous studies that motivation is the actual energy for the functioning and performance quality of an organisation (cf. e.g. Rheinberg, Vollmeyer 2018). Therefore, the existing motivations of individuals have a pervasive effect on the resource side of an organisation. The social performance effects (output, outcome, effects, impact) and the operational effects (securing the budget, securing liquidity, securing performance) then emerge along this path. If we look at the impact model from the perspective of the important basic category 'trust', which is ground for the

## ***Die Genese von Hegemonie. Ein Erklärungsmodell mit dem ökonomischen Ansatz der Katallaxie von Hayek***

theory of action, since social action in complex structures always requires trust,<sup>56</sup> then the impact model can also be convincing. For Williamson, who has intensively studied 'trust', explains with regard to the type of trust that is decisive for us, the *institutional trust*, that it is particularly strongly context-bound and dependent on six areas (1996: 268f.): *societal culture, politics, regulation, professionalisation, networks* and *corporate culture*. We find all these items implicitly confirmed in the impact model.

If we apply this impact model to the clustered analysis of the current phenomena in the common good economy, then we can conclude that the changes on the client side collide directly with the political-legal framework and with the perspective of the service providers. The 'national economy' influences the political-legal system, which puts the service providers under structural pressure. Thus - metaphorically speaking - the service providers sit between the "chairs" of social changes and the expectations of the clients on the one hand, and the particular political-legal regime and its economic status quo on the other. These dilemmas are (currently) unsolvable: since the clients are currently in the middle of the wave of *cultural economisation* and the 'national economy' (without global, binding institutions) has no potential for change due to the transformation effects, the only systemic starting points for further development lie in the political-legal regime (which, however, only causes *disillusionment*) or with the service providers – now here in this article with the example of an adequate management model. In the future, Chase-Dunn/Hall have pointed out that economic evolution is triggered in particular by demographic and also ecological factors (1998: 326). In particular, these effects manifest themselves at four thresholds:

- new forms and levels of competition,
- new scarcities,
- new risks, and
- new demands for savings and investment (ibid.).

These issues are altogether clearly fulfilled in the common good economy. Thus, it is very likely that a *turn-over* is occurring in this context. As a matter of fact, the public economy has become to be a social hegemony of its own kind (within the welfare state) because of the monopoly of social service providers and a particular social governance which aims primarily on employability and not on inclusive society. Systematically speaking, we find a transgression of several thresholds, in the social system, we have a strong economisation within social relationships, which lead to massive social segregation. As a result, there is an extraordinary turmoil within the group of social enterprises. The impact model of social enterprises shows their direct impairments of the social hegemony, which make social management far more difficult than before.

Social enterprises must therefore proactively take this analysis into account and adapt their management systems in such a way that the hegemonial structures mentioned above can be

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<sup>56</sup> According to Luhmann (1984), trust has above all a complexity-reducing form and helps actors to higher decision-making and action capacity. "Trust is not an inference from the past, but it overlays the information it possesses from the past and risks a determination of the future" (ders. 1989: 20). As a result, by trust in interactions, the possibility can be transformed into the probability (cf. also Seele 2007: 225ff.).

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dealt with. In the next section, the author focuses on possible solution elements, which should be seen as organisational resilience factors: the *Civilizational Hexagon*.

### **6. Societal resilience against hegemony**

A weakness of Hayekian thinking is his conviction that spontaneous orders, which certainly have many advantages, are always better than other, e.g. established orders. However, as shown, he neglects the factor of a necessary normative evaluation of orders. A spontaneous as well as a established order can be perceived as bad as well as good – depending on the standard of evaluation. There are many historical examples of this. Other normative criteria, e.g. values (morals and ethics as well), are needed to deal with the above mentioned dilemmas (cf. Carey 1999). A look at the development of history of thought reveals the detachment of rule (and leadership) from its ethical-moral contexts (Hösle 1997: 54ff.) and the *apotheosis of technical-purpose-rational normalities* (Böhme 1989: 8f.) for several centuries. In modern times, especially since Machiavelli's "Il principe", the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a mandate to shape the *polis* was declared to be private and thus not (any longer) relevant for the legitimation of action. With this overemphasis on *ratio*, however, we have created a multifactorial complexity of socially specific spheres of life whose interdependencies result in a lack of clarity and thus induce increased (action) uncertainty for people (cf. Carey 1999: 78ff.). This is the anchor point for Hayek's economical thinking as well. At this point, the question of responsibility arises in the context of numerous risks and threats, such in the elapsed pandemic, for which no one was actually really responsible. *En effet* we need (again) a clear connection of ethics and morality with *ratio* - in the sense of an ethics of individual responsibility **and** a solidary responsibility for the effects of all our actions in sum. "This clear separation of politics [i.e. leadership] and morality, as we could still see at the beginning of the modern era up to our recent past, no longer exists" (Horster 1993: 41ff., especially 50f.; insertion by the author). As a finding, new requirements arise from the explanations on the context of unclear social complexities, namely a standard of good and successful societal and leadership action against the manifestation of hegemony. In other words: it is especially about the obligatory implementation of lived egalitarian values in society.

#### **6.1 The Civilizational Hexagon**

If we start from a civilisational approach, then always from the perspective of modern societies, which are pluralistic. This is to be understood as "the plurality of identities (and consequently of interests) in the sense of the multiplicity of selves and environment of opinions and 'truths', including different conceptions of justice" (Senghaas 1994: 17). Precisely because of the presupposed diversity of opinion and the premise of coexistence in modern mass societies there is a need for political forms of negotiation and decision-making (without the threat and use of violence). Civilisation and peace thus belong inseparably together. In many ways social enterprises are similar to political units. They also have to deal with plural identities, that is stake holders. The management challenge is to balance out different expectations and to fulfil simultaneously legal obligations in respect to social needs and public good. In political science the *civilisational hexagon* was conceived to accomplish precisely these tasks (Carey 1999).

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By many empirical and historical studies, the following model has been conceived to name the critical success factors of states establishing order, fulfilling tasks of good governance and dealing with the retention of the special political identity (see Fig. 16).




Fig. 16: The *Civilizational Hexagon* (Carey 1999)

In order to be able to deal constructively with operational dilemmas and hegemony, it is crucial that the process of action *intelligently* links the **political-institutional level** (which belongs to the *state's potential*) with the **individual-social level** (which belongs to the citizens). On the political-institutional side, it is important for the state on the one hand that it owns **(1) the monopoly of authority**. On the other hand, states have to convince or guarantee the **(2) constitutional legality** of its structures and institutions. On the individual-social level (citizens) it is important to (further) develop one's own **autonomy and additionally its limitation (3)** to guarantee the principle of self-determination. For states building it is crucial to "learn" that individual identity in a community or society cannot be lived out without restrictions. Therefore, the appropriate media are also needed here to establish an **(4) individual sense of community or solidarity** for the citizens. In order to complete the *Civilizational Hexagon*, **(5) positive values/norms** are needed, which as a hinge obligatorily connects the political-

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institutional with the individual-social level.<sup>57</sup> In this context of the political-institutional with the individual-social level, **(6) participation and democracy** of and in the states is equally essential.

These poles in the *Civilizational Hexagon* can be seen as reliance factors against hegemony. This model makes it clear that without values and the transmission of values and without participation, the two poles – political-institutional and individual-social level – may fall apart in society and the risks for operational disturbances and dysfunctional phenomena in the organisation increase. The *Civilizational Hexagon* should be understood as a balance model: the six corners should be considered equally weighted and the leadership system should be aligned with them. The central focal point should be filled with an ethical or moral system. In 1990s, Carey conceived four constitutive systems for community building: ethical system, legal system, political system and moral system (cf. Carey 1999). These can be found here again: the political and legal systems have an impact on the political-institutional level and also on the individual-social level. Ethical and moral systems are the centre of the *Civilizational Hexagon* by all means. There is naturally always tension and friction between the different spheres. Conflicts, by their very nature, are always a component within the membership or between groups. For this reason, there is a need for a stable conflict culture as a lived management practice, which is able to sustainably resolve conflicts and help balance the different expectations of the various groups towards an inclusive society.

In summary, compensating hegemonial structures the author derives the necessary shift towards value-oriented leadership on all societal levels. In the next section, the characteristics of values-oriented leadership as building block for societal resilience enterprises will be discussed in more detail.

### **6.2 Characteristics of ‘values-based leadership’**

Since some years now, theories and conceptions on the topic of economy and business ethics have increasingly appeared in the general public (cf. e.g. Lütge, Uhl 2018; Aaken, Schreck 2015; Küpper 2011; Noll 2013). One can conclude from this that ethics is a serious topic in economics. The question that thus arises is that of the characteristics or the features of values-oriented leadership.

In his approach to *integrative business ethics*, Ulrich (2016) defines different levels of values-guided action: the **level of the individual** with the characteristics of individual value system, convictions and experiences; the **level of the organisation** with the characteristics tradition and guiding principles of the facility, grown "implicitness", internal and external relationships; and the **level of the environment** with the characteristics: national and international conditions, relationship between politics – society – social enterprises for common welfare, social policy, society, partner for corporate citizenship/corporate volunteering. Even with this first classification,

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<sup>57</sup> In the view that the legal system has a structural coupling especially with values, one can read not only in Noll (2018), but also in Rüthers (2005: 269): "Every legal order is necessarily based on a certain value order, which in turn has ideological elements and roots. There is an indissoluble, permanent relationship between legal and worldview".

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we can establish a compatibility with the *Leadership Hexagon*: the side of the individual corresponds to the individual-social level in the *Hexagon*, the side of the organisation is reflected in the normative-institutional area. The environment refers to the embedding of the organisation in the political-judicial system of a society, described above. In addition, in a "Final Report of the Project on Securing Skilled Workers through Personnel Management and Development" in nursing, characteristics for "values-oriented leadership and communication" were developed as a building block against a shortage of skilled workers, which is considered as very important (Institut für Unternehmensentwicklung [IFU] 2015; see Fig. 17). The characteristics of values-oriented leadership are seen here primarily in the sense of the guiding principle for the mental evolvement of the workforce (cf. also a description of the guiding principle of "self-realisation" and the associated "exhausted subject" in Reckwitz 2019a: 203ff.): from individual handling (promotion), mental effort (mediation), inspiration (motivation) to the charismatic emanation of the leader (identification). This description also corresponds exactly to the individual-social level in the *Civilizational Hexagon* on the one hand.

<b>INDIVIDUAL HANDLING</b>	<b>MENTAL EFFORT</b>	<b>INSPIRATION</b>	<b>CHARISMATIC EMANATION</b>
Considering employees individually	Taking off established think structures	Motivating by a compelling vision/mission	Communicating enthusiasm
Supporting employees individually	Conciliating new insights	Increasing the meaning of goals and tasks	Appearing as person for identification  Acting upright (correctly)
<b>Individually</b>	<b>Intellectually</b>	<b>Inspiring</b>	<b>Charismatic</b>

**Quelle:** Abschlussbericht des Projekts zur Fachkräftesicherung durch Personalmanagement und -entwicklung im Verbund von kleinen und mittelständischen Pflegeeinrichtungen (Instituts für Unternehmensentwicklung der Akademie Überlingen [Februar 2015])




Fig. 17: Characteristics of values-based leadership (Institut für Unternehmensentwicklung der Akademie Überlingen 2015)

After these initial confirmations, the author next conceives a dimension tableau of values-oriented action, which is to serve as the basis for values-oriented leadership and resilient social enterprises (see Fig. 18).

In the model of the *Civilizational Hexagon*, the author has made it clear that the focus should be on an ethical-moral system. Various sources for this can be taken from philosophy or religion(s). In addition, in a debate, the professional conceptualisations of approaches for economy and business ethics can be used. Business and professional associations in Germany have recently

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published numerous initiatives to develop ethical positions for companies. With these documents, industry representatives show how important the dimension of ethics is for doing business: cf. e.g. "10 Thesen zur Ethik der Wirtschaft" (10 Theses on Ethics in Business) by the Bundesverband Deutscher Volks- und Betriebswirte e.V. (bdvb 2009), "Ehrenkodex des Ethikverbandes der deutschen Wirtschaft e.V. (EVW)" (Code of Ethics of the Ethics Association of German Business) or "Senat der Wirtschaft" (Senate of Business) (o.J.).




Fig. 18: Dimension table of values-oriented action (own representation)

All these sources can be further "operationalised" by the well-known *value quadrilateral* (cf. Wieland 2004): in performance values, communication values, cooperation values and moral values. These values naturally extend into the **normative management** of companies. This means that in (not only social-economic) enterprises, the importance of normative management with its elements – visions, mission, guiding principles – with the purpose of shaping a clearly recognisable corporate culture, is gaining and has gained in importance in this economic transition. Finally, the author deductively identifies two further domains for corporate ethical action in addition to the well-known socio-ethical fields of corporate social *responsibility* (CSR) and

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*corporate governance* (CG). Firstly, in the context of the globalised economy, which can now be experienced, not only in pandemic times, transnational effects play a decisive role in a regional or local perspective (cf. also Bude, Staab 2016; Weiss 2017; Ferdowsi 2007). These include the existence of a functioning democracy (cf. Sen 2007), respect for human rights and the promotion of a humane economy and financing.<sup>58</sup> This area does not necessarily have a direct impact on the common good economy, but can nevertheless puncture and jeopardise social funding (cf. Streeck 2013). A particularly high and important relevance – especially for the near future – is the topic of a *values-oriented organisational development* with the keyword "healthy work". It is precisely in times of pandemics that a state (perhaps) realises what it has neglected to do in all the past years, possibly foregoing investments in systemically important areas in favour of other economic or budgetary policy goals and now having to pay dearly (and uneconomically) for *moral hazard effects*. Just in the past pandemic times, the poor working conditions and the frustration of not well-paid qualified workers in the care and education professions have been revealed in Germany.<sup>59</sup> The topic of "healthy work" is/will be an important social-ethical field and can be a good profiling strategy for (social economy) enterprises and other organisations. Thus, we can point to a special result for the operational management of the 21st century: In order to make the systemic *Civilizational Hexagon* fruitful for social entities and their resilience, the authentic and cohesion-promoting development of values orientated management is required. And actually, only then in the derivation of the governmental management should the correspondingly appropriate strategy against hegemonial structures be developed by further implementation.

### **7. On the way to societal resilience against hegemony**

There is growing evidence that the current economic system is being undermined by transnational interdependencies, shifts in the economic base and global threats: the rise of militarisation, economic financing crises, ecological threats (pandemics, climate change, destruction of natural life-support systems), the struggle for cultural sovereignty and the piling up of ideologies (also in the scientific community), information explosions of fake news and "messages" laden with negative emotions. The so-called *economisation* is only one aspect. This also includes the increase in financing obstacles in social management: due to ever stronger bank financing; only stronger project-related financing of so-called innovative ideas without follow-up financing options possible; ever lower graded professional staff; "outsourcing" of essential elements of social services to the "voluntary". Based on the above, it should be clear that the society is in a crucial transitional phase and prone for hegemony. The guiding question is to understand how hegemony

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<sup>58</sup> For example, during the financial crisis of 2008 it became known that many German municipalities (especially their municipal pension funds) had invested in bad shares of the US real estate industry in the form of derivative financial instruments (quasi as pseudo reserves) and that these then had to be devalued as junk in the course of the crisis - at the expense of public budgets. In some cases, the pension funds led to an even greater indebtedness of the German municipalities. As a result, many innovative socio-educational projects could no longer be financed or did not receive grant funding.

<sup>59</sup> First indications for better working conditions in nursing can be found in the introduction of the final report of a literature study, which was conducted and published by the author on behalf of the Institut für Qualitätssicherung in der Pflege e.V. (Institute for Quality Assurance in Nursing) and on behalf of the Bavarian State Ministry for Health and Nursing (StMGP) (Behrens, Carey 2015/2016. 14ff.). See also Carey 2017.

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“works”, presented by examples of different spheres, and which resilient factors are able to cope with the impact of societal hegemony as Gramsci has envisioned?

In a first step, we had to define – on the grounds of Gramsci – what hegemony is. In this respect, hegemony means a group or organization, which has decisive, especially economical resources to pursue their interest without rigorous enforcement and actually balancing out multiple interests of a society to reach a political integrated entity.

For the further argumentation, socio-philosophical and socio-economic perspectives were necessary. An anthropological look back shows that ‘organisation’ and ‘leadership’ of people and groups has always adapted to the historical-cultural framework and vice versa. With recourse to Hayek, the analytical distinction between spontaneous and established orders emerged. In a further development, an understanding of a structural coupling between these and beyond both order structures (with a focus on spontaneous orders) had to be developed. In this context, the concepts of **catallactic interlocking** 1st and 2nd orders (with the important principle of *reciprocity*) were conceived to justify the community-constituting interplay of spontaneous and established orders. Only by this manner, institutions, which (are supposed to) guarantee the stability of interactions, come into being and reduce the uncertainty and limitedness of knowledge experienced by people.

The results of the functioning of society and hegemony are:

1. The respective characteristics of an economic system are not rigid, but correspondingly dependent on the thinking and actions of the actors, which are mainly and directly shaped by the specific social structure of the actors.
2. In a world of generally limited knowledge, actors develop structures of order, namely institutions or rules, in order to cope with the uncertainty resulting from this cognitive dilemma. These cognitive order matrices, described by Hayek as **patterns of thought** or by Carey as **thought-calculi**, form the respective economic system and shape the organisations and leaders operating within it. In addition, the specific legal system, as demonstrated by legal anthropology, always “functions” as an order and production protection function (of the political and economic community).
3. Institutions **emerge** via *reciprocity* as spontaneous orders (‘decentralised knowledge’) or are **constructed** as established orders (‘available single point knowledge’) via *secondary* and *tertiary rules*. ‘Leadership’ and ‘organisation’ are 1st order *catallactic* interlocking by **reciprocal emergence** and **singular construction**, which can only attain a high degree of stability in this manner. This stability of orders can then be transformed in a 2nd order *catallactic* interlocking – as described by Hayek, but also North – to a meta-order, such as an institution of a market process.
4. **Hegemony** derives from the **catallaxy** (first order) between spontaneous orders to established orders. With the input of material energy, resources (capital, law, power etc.) can be obtained for restructuring becoming interlockings with catallaxies of second orders. It tries to maintain a catallactic balance of first and second orders. The (sudden) change of resources can change thresholds and disturb balances.

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The next analysis dealt with the functioning of politics with the focus on hegemonial structures, which are hindering political management. Thus, we noted at the outset that politics have several structural dilemmas that strongly influence political action: (1) the **security dilemma** leads to increased **militarisation** of interactions and can induce arms spirals; (2) the **development dilemma** and **economisation**, which sets boundaries between centre and periphery, produces asymmetric economic and socio-cultural relations; (3) the **ecology dilemma**, which threatens or even destroys political action and political structures through the anthropogenic destruction of ecological and natural cycles (this should lead to a new thought calculation: the **ecologisation**); (4) the **value dilemma**, which can lead to a collision of values and ethics and to hegemonial structures as well; (5) the **coordination dilemma**, which works through the structure of a prisoner's dilemma and prevents political actors from achieving optimal results. As a result, one can state, that hegemony may build up in situations of known political dilemma situation. We can count – depending on available resources – four affinities for political-societal hegemonies: the security dilemma, the economy dilemma, the ecology dilemma, the values dilemma, and the coordination dilemma. These spheres are prone to hegemonial structures.

Further analyses brought to light the continuing global crises triggered by unstabilised major currencies in the global North. Additionally, we have societal dynamics, which can be explained by the socio-economic development model by Carey. Due to this scenario, a deeper economic collapse with fundamental effects on the economy, the social network and its financing is to be expected with a certain probability, as has already happened in Greece (2011) or in the south of Italy (2010s). Hence, more economic changes with tremendous effects for the administration can be anticipated. Yet, the transformative power is not only existent within the general world system. It is also happening on a “deeper” level of the state and the economic system. Actually, we could establish a transformative development of the state from the territorial state via the constitutional state to the welfare state, possibly even to a denizen state in the case of a positive development. The same counts for the (global) economic system. The plausibility check was achieved redundantly with the transformation matrix of the ISSC, which was also able to show a transformation potential with the four axes 'national/global' and 'slow, gradual/fast, catalytic'. It has been already remarked that, if one looks exclusively at the development of the Capitalist system, serious transformations can also be clearly shown here, as the respective accumulation regimes (coupled with the input factors energy and information) changed.

For the globalised economy, one can name this overwhelming structural change globalisation as a category for dynamic, transnational and supra-regional transactions of many kinds. The current globalisation is different from earlier times in three different respects:

- 1) development of global debt to an economically unmanageable extent (and can only be held together more or less by the trust of the population in their respective political system);
- 2) serious decoupling of the financial economy from the real economy via the exorbitant virtual inflation of the money supply;

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3) synchronous and cumulative shift of n-dimensional attractors in the world system and loss of a global state of equilibrium.

The development in modern times has produced the state in its present form and functionally differentiated it in many ways: into a territorial state, a constitutional state and a welfare state. The cleavages mentioned above developed around specific attractors in relation with different forms of the state. Hegemonial structures transform themselves by the evolutionary development of governmental functions. In the territorial state, hegemony is raised by grounds, resources, and population (e.g. imperialism); in the constitutional state, hegemony becomes a reality by monopolizing opinions (e.g. mobilizing votes) and culture (e.g. media imperialism, social media); in the welfare state, hegemony is established by demand orientated economic policies, social services, and social benefits. In the denizen-state, hegemonial structures will probably be secured by more or less “healthy” ecological *lebensraum*, which are able to be encapsulated.

Taking into account these three functional manifestations of the modern European state - territorial state, constitutional state and welfare state – it is possible to identify in each case separate but also contradictory lines of conflict, which ought to be controlled by the state. The big agenda in the welfare state is the financing of the welfare state (in the form of balancing the budget) and its social services. As a litmus test, the functionality of the welfare state must always be measured by its ability to be financed while at the same time meeting the qualitative needs of meritorious goods. Due to the afore mentioned upheaval and shift in the world system with declining growth in the global North and an increasing mountain of debt, the financial viability of social systems in the European states is very much at risk. Consequently, the welfare state is the weakest element in the state triad and, if further intensified, would probably undermine the constitutional legality and lead to autocratic forms of rule (e.g. Turkey, Russia, China) and the return of privatised violence (e.g. USA). A decisive factor in understanding the modern European state is that it is a dynamic reflection of the respective economic system. Thus, starting from the transformation of capitalism, the analogous corresponding development of the welfare state and its social services could be demonstrated. With the transformation of the capitalist system, it is clear that the welfare state will also be transformed. With the envisaged changes due to climate change and the resulting "displacement" (the author coined the term *existential migration* for this [cf. Carey 2018]) of populations through the manifold destructions of livelihoods, a new type of state could emerge in the positive sense of civilization: the *denizen state*, in which it is not the nation as a construction of identity that is decisive, but the people-inhabitants of a region. Here – and actually always – the political agenda is about securing the basis of life.

As a basic deduction about the future of the welfare state, the following can be stated after this argumentation:

- A loss of sovereignty and restrictions on the autonomy of state action as a result of globalised processes, but also due to the consolidation of European transactions within the European Union are undeniable. This can be seen as positive for a distinct human rights policy based on the UN Charter. On the negative side, the financialisation of the economic system and the accumulation of – no longer affordable – debts have created a

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new relationship of dependency, i.e. a different kind of colonisation relationship vis-à-vis the (globally operating) *financial oligarchy*, so that the governing party and its programme *en effet* no longer really matter.

- There is a causality between economic activities and the state as a social policy actor. When economic forces weaken, state social policy loses its scope for action – something that has been observable since the 1990s. Neither can full employment be achieved through the economic structural change (if necessary with acceptance of the increase in atypical and precarious employment, as in Germany), nor can (labour and social policy) ensure the decoupling of wage and social security policy from productivity progress (since growth and productivity figures are too low and becoming lower and/or wage policy cannot compensate for inflation – let alone that this could not be financed at all without incurring even more debt on the part of the state), nor can a further expansion or only the maintenance of social services be achieved with the help of tax revenue. Consequently, as already mentioned, the financing of the social sector is dependent on economic growth and the development of the number of employees. The functioning of the welfare state will (have to) be measured in its distributive implementation against the normative yardstick of justice in order to induce trust in the political system. Should this not succeed well enough in a state system, then right-wing populism (largely based on right-wing nationalist/right-wing extremist ideology) can mobilise and instrumentalise the citizens, who perceive themselves as "losers of globalisation", for its own purposes.
- Most states of the global North have lived beyond their means in the last decades (if one counts the world wars, which were disastrous in an economic sense as well as in terms of human life, then one must indeed speak of the century). The increase in prosperity during the *trente glorieuses* certainly led to a rise in living standards and better provision. But neglected or only half-hearted investments in family reproduction, in the social provision of basic necessities (e.g. social insurance) and in the public infrastructure of mobility, energy (networks) and information are now taking revenge in the management of the various crises that are occurring more and more frequently in Europe and elsewhere.

With the concept of **catallaxy**, it was possible in the following analysis to sort the entire spectrum of social enterprises with 5 common good or public economy production types with a *catallaxy index* (coordination/steering via 'decentralised knowledge' or via 'single point available knowledge'): public-judicial production, community-oriented production, market-oriented production, comrade economy production and citizenship economy production in social spaces. The next step was to describe the current dynamics in the common good economy respectively public economy sector. For this, the concept of the socio-psychological two *logics* of 'affiliation and value attribution (valorisation)' (VALUES) on the one hand and the 'rational' (WORTH) on the other hand was used. Social enterprises and the public economy are caught exactly between these two *logics*. Therefore, the scientific basis for these domains is also 'split'. In recent decades, as some observers confirm, the *logic of affiliation and valorisation* has become stronger in the

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societies of the global North and has consequently latently advanced the '*economisation of the social*'. Causes for this structural change are probably rooted in three bundles of factors:

- 1) transformation of the economic system to a different form of capitalism (shift of the economic basis from material good to immaterial good; shift to new private money creation structures and increase in public debt);
- 2) globalised production processes and digitalisation of living spaces;
- 3) multiple individualisation processes.

The author assumes, however, that this *cultural economisation* will expand even further. The different modes of regulation in the 5 types of production are overlaid with a completely different mode of steering, namely that of the meta-criteria of *attractiveness* or *reputation* and *attention* or *recognition* of social work enterprises. Evidence of this can already be found in the current socio-marketing concepts of social enterprises. By transferring the findings of *cultural-economic* structural change to the – for reasons of clarity – sorted clustering of the social-economic framework conditions (client, service provider, national economy, and political-legal framework conditions), the current *state* of the public economy can be well diagnosed and confirmed. Society and the client are changing in such a way that the service providers, who are systemically "pressured" by the globalised economy and the political-legal regime to offer standardised products of 'social work', 'care' and 'disease management', find themselves in direct collision or direct contradiction with the social expectations and the immediate needs of the clients. Service providers are thus caught in a vicious economic circle. The impact model for social economy enterprises also shows the two resounding factors and their interactions of socio-demographic/socio-economic influences on the one hand and socio-psychological influences on the motivations unfolding in the organisation on the other. These two levels must be taken into account for an adequate resilient model on basis of leadership. Significantly, the eminent importance of values (and also of trust) for the long-term stabilisation of social actions has been revealed several times in the argumentation. Social entities must therefore proactively take this analysis into account and adapt their management systems in such a way that the hegemonial structures mentioned above can be dealt with. In this case, a possible solution element can be seen as organisational resilience factors against hegemony: the *Civilizational Hexagon*.

The conceived *Civilizational Hexagon* helps us to identify factors, which help states to be resilient and to foster stability and functioning. The cornerstones are: values/norms, monopoly of authority, constitutional legality, democracy and participation, sense of community/solidarity and limitation of autonomy. The field of conflict culture is a necessary must as a medium in all spheres. The *Civilizational Hexagon* now allows the relationships between the cornerstones to be illuminated in detail. At this point, a dichotomy could be identified, namely between an individual-social level (with the points limitation of autonomy, sense of community and solidarity) and a political-institutional level (with the points monopoly of authority, constitutional legality). The top focus is a theory of justice, which can compensate unjust configurations like dominant or hegemonic structures that set up barriers (which cannot be justified in a general and reciprocal way). With

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this *Hexagon*, it can also be shown that values/norms and democracy and participation stand between the individual-social and political-institutional level, even mediate them, and are therefore particularly important in a community-building process. With these first results, the next steps of argumentation can be pursued.

So, in order to compensating hegemonial structures the necessary shift towards value-oriented leadership on all societal levels is needed. The decisive point – neglected by Hayek – is, however, that orders per se are 'not good' or 'good', but are (have to be) evaluated obligatorily and rationally by us humans with a respective **standard of values**. The economic system, e.g. 'capitalism', is therefore as bad and as good as we *think* it is: it is not per se evil and 'inhuman', as was conveyed in the tenor of the *ideologization of the 'inhuman economy'*. Finally, the characteristics of value-oriented leadership were presented descriptively in a further step. Practical ethical ideas can be developed on the basis of concepts from philosophy, religion and economy ethics/business ethics to form a "quadrilateral of values" within a normative management that is to be implemented, specific to the company and the organisation. In a deductive derivation, four ethical business areas were identified: *Globalisation effects*, *Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)*, *Corporate Governance (CG)* and – as a "new" ethical business field – *value-oriented organisational development* with the current topos "healthy work". In the last implementation analysis, the best-known strategy approaches in corporate management practice were examined qualitatively with regard to their compatibility with value-oriented leadership. The best result for the *Civilization Hexagon*, taking into account the coupling of spontaneous and established orders, promises the operational implementation and continuation of a systematic **strategic-normative management**. Only then, in the derivation of the governmental management the correspondingly appropriate strategy should be developed against hegemonial structures.

Let me finish this contribution with the following quotation:

*It is too late for pessimism.  
We know very well that there are solutions.  
It is in our power to bring about change.*

Yann Arthus-Bertrand (2009: 5)

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