

# Reframing active labour market policy \*

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## 1 Introduction

Active labour market policies, and more specifically training courses for the unemployed, have been shown to generate long-lasting positive effects on re-employment, but also subsequent earnings and the length of the subsequent employment spell (Card, Kluge, and Weber, 2018; Crépon, Ferracci, and Fougère, 2012; Hofer, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer, 2013; Rinne, Schneider, and Uhlenhorff, 2011) as well as mental health (Wang et al., 2021). These effects are even more pronounced for disadvantaged groups in the labour market, such as women, less educated, and long-term unemployed (Card, Kluge, and Weber, 2018) and thus play an important role in enabling upward social mobility. While the benefits of training are, thus, clearly established in the literature, unemployed are often reluctant to participate in training offered to them and perceive assignment as a burden or even punishment. This is even more puzzling, given that training programs are typically provided for free by the Public Employment Service (PES). Consequently, the question arises: why are unemployed reluctant to have this 'free lunch'? Answering this question with our field experiment will shed light on how the uptake in training can be increased to improve employment prospects of jobseekers and enable social mobility.

In February 2021, we launched a field experiment that consisted of an information treatment provided to unemployed. The intervention was implemented by the Public Employment Service of Lower Austria (*Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterreich (AMS NÖ)*). The goal was to increase enrollment in training with the aim of increasing reemployment chances and job quality among jobseekers. We randomly allocated a large number of unemployed in Lower Austria to three treatment groups and one control group. The first treatment group received a newsletter informing

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\*The experiment and pre-analysis plan are registered as AEARCTR-0007141. The code is available on GitHub. The experiment was reviewed and approved by the Departmental Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oxford and by the Competence Center for Experimental Research at the Vienna University of Economics and Business.

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them about training opportunities offered by the PES; the second treatment group additionally received a training voucher to be redeemed with the PES up to a value of €15.000,-; the third treatment group received additional information on open vacancies by occupation. The intervention consisted only of the variation in the information provided with all options and obligations remaining the same for individuals of all four groups. The treatment arms were designed to separate out interacted effects of raising awareness (treatment 1: newsletter), combined with strengthening reciprocity and autonomy (treatment 2: voucher), and combined with reducing asymmetric information (treatment 3: job info).

First results show that our treatment increases take-up and completion of more qualified courses, while it reduces take-up of other ALMPs (activation and subsidized employment). Additionally including information about vacancies however offsets these effects fully, which is mainly driven by a discouraging effect on groups with a more advantaged position on the labour market. These effects are not a mere shift towards earlier training, but are sustained over one year after the intervention. We do not find any lock-in effects (i.e. short-term negative effect on employment) of this increased training participation, which is in line with the literature showing that these are attenuated in times of recession and high unemployment (Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2018; Lechner and Wunsch, 2009). Further, we do not find any effects on employment one year after the intervention.

We also expect several additional results by October. We received data on longer-term employment outcomes as well as data on entry wages and incomes in the beginning of March 2023. We will thus be able to estimate more encompassing effects on employment outcomes, and specifically job quality as measured by wages. We will then also be able to use our randomized intervention as an instrument for training participation to estimate causal effects of training on employment outcomes for those at the margin. Moreover, we started a follow-up experiment in July 2022 that will be running for a year. The experiment is designed in a way to get additional insights on some mechanisms for our treatment effects of the first experiment and will also increase the robustness and credibility of our results. We expect to have first preliminary results for this experiment by October.

The inclusion of a training voucher as treatment follows from the related literature on the effects of voucher systems on employment outcomes. On the one hand, motivation to take-up and complete courses is generally high due to the increased autonomy in such systems (Doerr and Strittmatter, 2018; Barnow, 2009). Further, the financial value of training courses is much more apparent, as the voucher has a specific, visible price tag for which it can be redeemed. This is found to increase the appreciation of training opportunities by the unemployed and thus, to induce reciprocity in the form of increased motivation to participate and complete the programs (Doerr and Strittmatter, 2018; Barnow, 2009). On the other hand, the increased autonomy also makes information asymmetries more relevant and it is thus important to provide the unemployed with the necessary knowledge to be able to choose adequate training, such as information on job opportunities (Barnow, 2009;

Strittmatter, 2016). However, our intervention differs from this literature, as actual autonomy in choosing courses is not altered for the voucher treatment groups, but only the information about and framing of training.

Our study mostly relates to the surging literature on information interventions in economics in general (see Haaland, Roth, and Wohlfart (2020) for a very general summary) and targeting unemployed more specifically. In the latter context, most research has focused on analysing the effect of information and assistance about job search on re-employment rates (Altmann et al., 2018; Belot, Kircher, and Muller, 2019; Briscese, Zanella, and Quinn, 2020). Belot, Kircher, and Muller (2019) and Briscese, Zanella, and Quinn (2020) offer more encompassing interventions than simple information provision, as they vary an online job search tool, and find positive effects on employment and job match quality. Altmann et al. (2018) send out an information brochure about job search strategies and consequences of unemployment, which increases employment and earnings for those at higher risk of long-term unemployment. There is little evidence on interventions targeting active labour market policies, and more specifically training. Barr and Turner (2018) show for the U.S. that letters sent from the PES informing jobseekers about benefits and costs of training, and the application process and assistance available, increased enrolment in training drastically. Further, Dhia and Mbih (2020) investigate in more detail the types of information that can help increase training enrolment, by varying only small details of newsletters sent by the PES in France. They find increased callback rates for jobseekers who received information about returns to training and the simplicity of the application process, but do not find any differences in training enrolment (Dhia and Mbih, 2020).

We contribute to the literature by focusing on active labour market policies instead of job search. Further, we are able to differentiate between different forms of training and other active labour market policies, allowing us to estimate substitution effects. Additionally, we can shed light on the underlying mechanisms of such interventions with our four-arm treatment design. This enables us to separate out treatment effects of awareness, reciprocity, and asymmetric information.

## 2 Methodology

### 2.1 Experimental design

Four different treatment arms vary the type of information provided and the perceived value of PES training and autonomy that the unemployed have in choosing a training program. The unemployed in the sample will be randomly allocated to each of the 4 groups on an individual level.<sup>1</sup> We stratified randomization by gender, age, education, region, and unemployment duration.

*Treatment group 1* received a newsletter in February 2021 with information on PES training to

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<sup>1</sup>More detailed information about the intervention can be found in the Pre-Analysis plan (AEARCTR-0007141)

raise awareness of the training opportunities provided (see Figure 4). The newsletters for *treatment groups 3 and 4* additionally included a voucher to be redeemed with the PES for training up to a value of €15.000,-, or up to €3.000,- for any training provided externally<sup>2</sup> (see Figure 5 for the adapted Newsletter and Figure 3 for the voucher). Finally, *treatment group 4* receives additional information on occupations with the highest number of open vacancies intended to counteract the already discussed problem of asymmetric information in the voucher context (see Figure 6). The control group is not contacted at all but continues to have access to training and regular PES consultations. Other than that, all options and obligations remain the same for individuals of all four groups.

The intervention consists only of the variation in the information provided and this has to be kept in mind when interpreting estimated effects of the different treatments. The newsletter would, thus, have an effect through increasing awareness and providing information about training. Any effects of the voucher will be due to higher perceived autonomy or higher (financial) valuation of the PES training program, as discussed in the introduction. In the fourth treatment group the additional information is intended to reduce asymmetric information between the case worker and the jobseeker, which could lead the latter to make more informed choices and to improve her bargaining position towards the job counselor.

We additionally sent out a follow-up survey one month after the intervention. The survey was designed to get additional information on our participants (e.g. on their attitudes towards the PES, their mental health and social inclusion, their job finding expectations, and reservation wage), as well as potential mechanisms of our treatment interventions. Concerning the latter, we included questions on whether they participate in training and why or why not. We additionally tailored the survey depending on the treatment group the respondent was in, so that we could include questions on the specific newsletter they received.

## 2.2 Institutional context

The newsletters are embedded in the broader PES advertisement campaign *Corona-Joboffensive* to promote participation in training programs amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. In addition to contacting unemployed directly via our intervention, the PES is establishing a separate hotline for consultations on training opportunities and advertising training opportunities in regional newspapers.

Currently, by law (*Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz (ALVG §9)*), unemployed are assigned to labour market programs by the PES. This takes place after a consultation with the job counselor. In most cases, consultations with the job counselors and program assignment is obligatory, i.e. with conditionality attached. If an unemployed does not attend a PES appointment or assigned program - typically with no shows - the unemployment benefits can be cut or - in the most severe cases -

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<sup>2</sup>The PES generally provides funding of up to €3.000,- for training programs of external suppliers, including for *groups 1 and 2*. However, this is not advertised and therefore awareness will be limited for *group 1 and 2*.

blocked temporarily. As a result, assignment to a training program is often perceived negatively as a burden or punishment rather than positively as an opportunity and support.

However, unemployed can also suggest trainings that they deem relevant. Job counselors are then required to assess the adequacy of the course and have to approve it. Job counselors approve suggestions for training programs as long as they credibly contribute to increasing the employment prospects of the unemployed. The time span between selection and start of the course is held as short as possible; usually well below 3 months. Training program participants generally continue to receive their unemployment benefits. Financial incentives to enrolment are provided for training programs with a duration of at least 4 months starting in 2021. They amount to €4,- per day, which makes around 10-20% of the benefits received for the median unemployed. The duration of the courses varies substantially, depending on the type of course, between several days/weeks up to 18 months for apprenticeship programs. In general, the intervention focuses on longer training programs with a duration starting at around 10 weeks.

## 2.3 Data

Our sample comprises of around 11.000 unemployed, as documented in the pre-analysis plan. This includes all unemployed with an unemployment spell of 2 to 3 and 6 to 12 months at the time of treatment. Individuals with the status *unemployed* as well as *in job search* are included - meaning that all registered unemployed are included regardless of whether they receive unemployment benefits or not. Unemployed who are already enrolled in training at the time of the intervention are excluded from the sample. The sample is further restricted to people, who are at least 25 years old, do not have a pending job acceptance, and have a valid email address. Further, the post-treatment survey is sent out to the entire sample. The response rate for the post-treatment survey was 32%, which is relatively high when comparing it to similar interventions (Dhia and Mbih (2020) had a response rate of 13%).

Our outcome variables are course take-up and completion (for any type of course), unemployment duration, (subsidized) employment status and duration, and income. Further, we can differentiate between different types of courses, such as training, activation courses, courses with an exam in the end, and courses with long duration.

Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample grouped by treatment assignment. In terms of characteristics our sample is what would be expected. We have relatively high rates of people with only compulsory schooling. The share of people with some kind of health restriction, as well as non-Austrian nationality is also higher than in the general population in Austria. In terms of employment history, we see that gross monthly income is relatively low on average and that the range is relatively wide. The same holds for days in employment and the number of different employment spells, which should indicate the continuity of employment before their

current unemployment spell. The Table also shows the p-value of Chi-squared tests for the categorical variables as well as of ANOVAs for the continuous variables. None of the variables differ significantly between the four groups and p-values are far from significant. One can also see that the stratification worked perfectly, as the p-values for the stratification variables all equal 1.

Table 1: Sample characteristics across treatment groups

	Control (N=2769)	Newsletter (N=2766)	NL+Voucher (N=2760)	NL+Voucher+Info (N=2755)	p value
<b>Gender</b>					0.999
Women	1437 (51.9%)	1434 (51.8%)	1433 (51.9%)	1434 (52.1%)	
Men	1332 (48.1%)	1332 (48.2%)	1327 (48.1%)	1321 (47.9%)	
<b>Age group</b>					1.000
Below 35 years	831 (30.0%)	828 (29.9%)	826 (29.9%)	823 (29.9%)	
35 - 50 years	1062 (38.4%)	1067 (38.6%)	1064 (38.6%)	1063 (38.6%)	
above 50 years	876 (31.6%)	871 (31.5%)	870 (31.5%)	869 (31.5%)	
<b>Education</b>					1.000
Missing	10	9	8	9	
Compulsory schooling	897 (32.5%)	898 (32.6%)	896 (32.6%)	891 (32.4%)	
Higher than compulsory	1862 (67.5%)	1859 (67.4%)	1856 (67.4%)	1855 (67.6%)	
<b>Unemployment duration</b>					1.000
3 - 4 Months	676 (24.4%)	675 (24.4%)	671 (24.3%)	668 (24.2%)	
6 - 9 Months	937 (33.8%)	937 (33.9%)	937 (33.9%)	934 (33.9%)	
9 - 12 Months	1156 (41.7%)	1154 (41.7%)	1152 (41.7%)	1153 (41.9%)	
<b>Nationality</b>					0.778
Missing	1	2	3	1	
Austria	2147 (77.6%)	2146 (77.6%)	2150 (78.0%)	2165 (78.6%)	
other	621 (22.4%)	618 (22.4%)	607 (22.0%)	589 (21.4%)	
<b>Health</b>					0.991
No health restriction	2185 (78.9%)	2177 (78.7%)	2168 (78.6%)	2169 (78.7%)	
Health restriction	584 (21.1%)	589 (21.3%)	592 (21.4%)	586 (21.3%)	
<b>Marginal employment</b>					0.733
No	2457 (88.7%)	2479 (89.6%)	2467 (89.4%)	2463 (89.4%)	
Yes	312 (11.3%)	287 (10.4%)	293 (10.6%)	292 (10.6%)	
<b>German skills</b>					0.456
Partial or none	404 (14.6%)	403 (14.6%)	377 (13.7%)	418 (15.2%)	
Proficient or native	2365 (85.4%)	2363 (85.4%)	2383 (86.3%)	2337 (84.8%)	
<b>pre- unemployment income</b>					0.436
Missing	38	50	41	46	
Mean (SD)	1468.213	1483.796	1459.140	1514.046	
Range	14.69 - 6385.15	14.78 - 6385.15	4.00 - 6385.15	12.73 - 6385.15	
<b>Days in employment (since 2011)</b>					0.499
Mean (SD)	2553.876	2547.052	2622.679	2547.931	
Range	0 - 15005	0 - 14461	0 - 14995	0 - 15189	
<b>Employment spells (since 2011)</b>					0.725
Mean (SD)	5.802	5.643	5.718	5.776	
Range	0 - 139	0 - 90	0 - 72	0 - 77	

## 2.4 Estimation and inference

Due to the clean randomization of participants into control and treatment groups, it is possible to, in a first step, compare the relevant outcome variables directly between the 4 groups. To increase precision we will additionally estimate parametric regressions for the treatment effects using the following model:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_2 + \beta_2 T_3 + \beta_3 T_4 + \mathbf{X}_i + s_i + c_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  refers to the outcome variables for individual  $i$ . Depending on the scale of the outcome variable, an OLS(continuous) or a Logit(binary) regression is used. For our preliminary results, our outcome variables are all measured one year after the intervention (i.e. in February 2022). All training participation and completion variables, and the employment outcome equal 1 if the individual was in training/completed training/was in employment any time since the intervention. Unemployment duration and employment duration are measured in days since the intervention.  $T_2$  to  $T_4$  refer to the treatment groups as described above. We additionally control for all socio-demographic variables  $\mathbf{X}_i$ , that were not used for stratification, i.e. language proficiency, nationality, pre-unemployment occupation (ISCO-08), whether they are in marginal employment, their pre-unemployment income, and previous employment history. Further, as we used stratified randomization, we include strata dummies  $\mathbf{s}_i$ , following Athey and Imbens (2017). We also include counselor fixed effects  $\mathbf{c}_i$  as they are important for the training allocation procedure. We will further conduct pre-specified heterogeneity analysis via subgroup regressions by gender, age, education, unemployment duration, and pre-unemployment income.

### 3 Main results

#### 3.1 Training outcomes

Table 2 summarises our treatment effect estimates on different training outcomes. While we do not see significant effects on overall course take-up (even though positive point estimates), the voucher treatment increases course completion significantly. The effect is sizable - at around 12% of the control mean. This confirms results from the literature, where voucher programs can increase the perceived value of the courses and thus increase motivation to complete training. Further, we can differentiate between different types of courses. We see clear positive effects for the Newsletter and Voucher treatments on more demanding courses, such as training courses, courses with longer than median duration, and courses with some type of exam in the end. The effects are sizeable, given our low-key one-time intervention: around 15 to 20% of the control mean. However, unemployed seem to substitute away from activation courses and subsidized employment. This could explain the overall attenuated effect on course participation.

Table 2: Treatment effects on Training

	<i>Dependent variable (1 year after intervention):</i>						
	all courses	course completion	training courses	long duration	with exam	activation courses	subsidized employment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Newsletter	0.005 (0.010)	0.004 (0.009)	0.020** (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.013** (0.006)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.007 (0.011)
Voucher	0.014 (0.010)	0.018* (0.009)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.027** (0.011)
Job Info	-0.005 (0.010)	0.002 (0.009)	0.001 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.020* (0.011)
Control Mean	0.17	0.145	0.108	0.087	0.044	0.043	0.213
Observations	10,714	10,714	10,714	10,714	10,714	10,714	10,714

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ 

All regressions include all control variables specified in section 2. The outcomes are binary and take the value of 1 if the individual took part in the respective program any time in the one year after the intervention. The control mean is the mean of the outcome variable in the Control Group.

Interestingly, adding information on occupations with open vacancies offsets the positive effects of the Newsletter and the Voucher for all types of courses. We provide an explanation for this puzzling result below when looking at the heterogeneous effects.

In Figure 1 we plot the cumulative percentage of individuals in the four groups who have been in training courses since the intervention. We chose this outcome variable, as we see the biggest average effect on these types of training and because these are the courses which are most demanding and focus on human capital creation. The graph shows the very persistent effect of our intervention, where the Newsletter and Voucher group are clearly above the trajectory in the Control group and the group with job information. This indicates that our intervention does not just induce unemployed, who would have taken up training anyway, to take up training earlier. On the contrary, it seems to convince those unemployed to take up training, who wouldn't have done so in absence of the treatment.

Further, in Figure 2 we plot the treatment effects (with 90% confidence intervals) on participation in training courses within the subgroups indicated on the left. Overall, we see that the treatment effects are more pronounced for women, middle-aged and older unemployed and those with lower than median pre-unemployment earnings. Thus, more disadvantaged groups in the labour market react more to our treatment, which is positive given that they have been shown to profit over-proportionally from training (Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2018). Additionally, we see that the null-effect from the treatment with additional information on open vacancies masks considerable heterogeneity. While more disadvantaged groups seem to react positively to the treatment - particularly lower educated and those with lower pre-unemployment earnings - others even react negatively. Especially among middle-aged, those with higher than compulsory education or higher than median pre-unemployment earnings our intervention seems to discourage training.

Our post-treatment survey provides complimentary evidence. While 55% of low educated survey

Figure 1: Treatment effects on training courses over time





Figure 2: Heterogeneous treatment effects on training courses



participants found the information on job openings helpful, only 35% of those educated above the minimum did. Nearly 50% of the former would be willing to take one of the jobs advertised, while only 30% of the latter would do so. The differences are similar for middle-aged and younger job seekers. These findings suggest that too general information may have negative effects on subgroups for which it is not relevant. More specifically, this also indicates that many of the jobs

advertised via the PES have limited relevance for better educated jobseekers.

### 3.2 Employment outcomes

Eventually, we can also look at employment outcomes one year after the intervention in Table 3. The dependent variable in column 1 and 3 is a dummy taking the value 1 if the person has been in this labour market status anytime since the intervention. Column 2 and 4 measure (un-) employment duration in days since the start of the intervention. Employment only refers to unsubsidized market employment, thus excluding subsidized employment which we already discussed above. Unemployment duration also includes time spent in training during the time since the intervention.

We find no effects on employment or unemployment duration. Thus, we do not find lock-in effects as suggested by the literature.

Table 3: Treatment effects on Employment

	<i>Dependent variable (1 year after intervention):</i>			
	employed (1)	employment duration (2)	out of labour force (3)	unemployment duration (4)
Newsletter	-0.001 (0.013)	-3.575 (2.988)	0.019 (0.013)	0.723 (3.169)
Voucher	-0.015 (0.013)	-2.984 (3.020)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.697 (3.198)
Job Info	-0.012 (0.013)	-2.507 (3.019)	0.018 (0.013)	0.802 (3.185)
Control Mean	0.544	95.498	0.338	208.436
Observations	10,714	10,714	10,714	10,714

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

All regressions include all control variables specified in section 2. The outcomes in column 1 and 3 are binary and take the value of 1 if the individual had this employment status any time in the one year after the intervention. Employment and unemployment duration are measured in days since the intervention. The control mean is the mean of the outcome variable in the Control Group.

However, given the specific time of our intervention (amidst the Covid-19 crisis, lockdowns and high unemployment rates), it is not surprising that lock-in effects are small. Job opportunities may just have been minimal, also for the control group. This is in line with the literature, suggesting that lock-in effects of training programs are smaller during recessions (Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2018; Lechner and Wunsch, 2009). However, it seems that the probability to be employed decreased slightly for the Voucher and Job info groups, while the probability to drop out of the labour force increased for all groups, albeit below conventional significance thresholds. However, these results should be taken with caution, as we expect employment effects to manifest only after some time.

## 4 Outlook

Overall, our preliminary findings show that raising awareness (via the Newsletter) and increasing jobseekers' valuation of courses (via the Voucher) has the potential to increase training take-up and completion, especially for more demanding courses. Further, our results imply that researchers have to be very careful in designing information treatment interventions, as non-targeted information can have adverse effects on some subgroups. However, results on employment outcomes are still very short-term and future data will give more insights. We will receive data on longer-term employment outcomes in the beginning of March 2023, as well as data on wages in jobs taken up after the unemployment spell. These will give more insights into employment effects, where we will especially focus on the quality of employment. As training is designed to build up skills of the unemployed and increase match quality, this should be mirrored in better jobs in those treatment groups that took up more training. Eventually, we can also use our randomized treatment assignment as an instrument for training participation. As we saw meaningful and sizable treatment effects on training participation, we can use this exogenous increase in training participation to estimate causal effects of training on our employment outcomes. By the time of the conference, we should be able to show these results as well.

Further, we also started a follow-up experiment in July 2022, which will go on over a year (more detailed information can be seen in the pre-analysis plan: AEARCTR-0009776). This will on the one hand increase the robustness and credibility of our estimates. On the other hand, we also slightly changed some parts of the design to gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms at work and increase external validity. First, we will send out the intervention<sup>3</sup> bi-monthly to all unemployed who entered their third quarter of unemployment duration<sup>4</sup>. This cancels out seasonal effects that may be at work in our current study due to the one-time nature of the intervention. Second, the time of this intervention is characterised by relatively tight labour market conditions, which is in contrast to the high unemployment rates amidst the Covid-crisis, which was the context of the first intervention. Thus, we will be able to contrast the effects of such a program depending on the macroeconomic situation of the labour market. Eventually, we refined and targeted the information on open vacancies depending on the educational level of the unemployed. This emerged directly from the heterogeneity of the effects for this treatment group in the first intervention and our proposed explanation for it, as described above. We are thus directly able to test this explanation and provide implications for future interventions on how to better target information. By October we will have first preliminary results for this intervention as well.

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<sup>3</sup>The stratified randomization procedure remains the same.

<sup>4</sup>Every person in the sample still only receives the treatment once

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## A Appendix: Treatment



# GUTSCHEIN\*

im Wert von bis zu € 15.000,- für eine  
Investition in Ihre berufliche Zukunft!

**JA**, ich mache mit. Der Gutschein\* hat einen Wert von bis zu € 15.000,-, wenn Sie eine Aus- oder Weiterbildung über das AMS machen. Ebenso können Sie sich am freien Bildungsmarkt selbst eine Aus- oder Weiterbildung aussuchen, die Ihre Chancen auf eine neue Beschäftigung erhöht. In diesem Fall hat der Gutschein\* einen Wert von bis zu € 3.000,-. In jedem Fall gilt: VORHER mit dem AMS Kontakt aufnehmen und die Förderbarkeit prüfen lassen!

Vorname	Nachname
E-Mail-Adresse	Telefonnummer
PLZ	Ort

Füllen Sie obenstehende Felder gleich online aus und übermitteln Sie uns das Formular, indem Sie auf den „Absenden“-Button klicken. Wir setzen uns dann so rasch wie möglich mit Ihnen in Verbindung. Gerne können Sie den Gutschein auch ausdrucken, ausfüllen und per E-Mail an [mailservice.seinoe@ams.at](mailto:mailservice.seinoe@ams.at) schicken.

\* Bitte beachten Sie, dass auf Förderungen kein Rechtsanspruch besteht. Dieser Gutschein kann bis 31.12.2021 eingelöst werden. Keine Barabläse möglich.

**ABSENDEN**

Um das Formular vollständig ausfüllen zu können laden Sie hier die Acrobat Reader App herunter oder besuchen Sie Ihren entsprechenden App-Store oder schreiben Sie uns einfach ein E-Mail.



Arbeitsmarktservice  
Niederösterreich

Figure 3: Voucher for groups 3 and 4

Bei Darstellungsproblemen klicken Sie [hier](#).



**Ihr Weg zum beruflichen Neustart**

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

auch jetzt in Zeiten der Krise gibt es nachgefragte Berufe und Qualifikationen mit Zukunft. Die Corona-Joboffensive bietet Ihnen die Möglichkeit, neue Qualifikationen zu erwerben, die Ihnen den Wiedereinstieg ins Berufsleben ermöglichen.

Darum lade ich Sie ganz persönlich ein: Nutzen Sie Ihre Chancen zum beruflichen Neustart mit einer Aus- oder Weiterbildung! Finden Sie gemeinsam mit Ihrer AMS-Beraterin oder Ihrem Berater den für Sie richtigen Weg zurück ins Berufsleben! In diesem Mail zeigen wir Ihnen, wie Ihr beruflicher Neustart gelingen kann.

Nehmen Sie Ihre berufliche Zukunft in die Hand – und bleiben Sie gesund!

Ihr

Sven Hergovich  
Landesgeschäftsführer des AMS Niederösterreich

**Aus- und Weiterbildung für den Neustart am Arbeitsmarkt**

Aktuelle und nachgefragte Qualifikationen sind der wichtigste Erfolgsfaktor für den beruflichen Neustart.

Ob Auffrischkurs für Ihre Fachkenntnisse oder eine Ausbildung mit Lehrabschluss - das AMS Niederösterreich hält eine Vielzahl von Aus- und Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten für Sie bereit.

Einige Beispiele:

- Metall- und elektrotechnische Berufe
- Mechatronik
- Berufskraftfahrer/in, Transportwesen
- Pflegeassistent / Pflegefachassistent

Verschaffen Sie sich einen Startvorteil am Arbeitsmarkt und nutzen Sie unsere Aus- und Weiterbildungsangebote!

**So finanzieren wir Sie während Ihrer Ausbildung**



Mit dem Schulungsgeld vom AMS sind Sie während der Ausbildung finanziell abgesichert. Der Betrag entspricht zumindest Ihrem Arbeitslohn oder Ihrer Notstandshilfe und wird unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen aufgestockt.

Zusätzlich erhalten Sie einen Bildungsbonus in Höhe von 4€ pro Tag, wenn Sie Arbeitslohn oder Notstandshilfe beziehen, Ihre Ausbildung zumindest vier Monate dauert und noch in diesem Jahr startet.

**Vorsorge und Sicherheit: Ihre Ausbildung während der COVID-19-Maßnahmen**



Das AMS nimmt die Situation um die COVID-19-Pandemie ernst. Deswegen passen wir gemeinsam mit unseren Partnerinstituten den Kursbetrieb laufend den gerade erforderlichen Corona-Schutzmaßnahmen an.

Damit Sie gesund bleiben und dennoch Ihre Ausbildung starten können, richtet sich das AMS dabei nach dem Grundsatz:

**Sozial Distance Learning wie möglich – so viel Präsenzunterricht wie notwendig!**

**Informieren Sie sich jetzt!**



Sie möchten mehr über Ihre Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten erfahren oder wünschen sich Unterstützung bei der Wahl Ihrer passenden Ausbildung?

Unsere ExpertInnen der AMS-Weiterbildungshotline stehen Ihnen bei Fragen montags bis donnerstags von 07:30h bis 16:00h und freitags von 07:30h bis 13:00h unter der Nummer **050 904 343** gerne telefonisch zur Verfügung.

Oder Sie schreiben ein [E-Mail](#).

[»Homepage](#) [»Datenschutz](#) [»Abbestellen](#)

Arbeitsmarktservice Dienstleistungswirtschaft des öffentlichen Rechts p.A. AMS Niederösterreich Hohenstaufengasse 2 1010 Wien Telefon: +43 (0) 50 904 343 Telefax: +43 (0) 50 904 300-190 E-Mail	UID: ATU 38908009 DVR: 4013345 Bankverbindung: BAWAG P.S.K. IBAN AT39 0200 0000 0000 0839 BIC:SWIFT BAWAATWW	Organe Alle Bankverbindungen des AMS Österreich Amtsregistratur Datenschutzbestimmungen
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Figure 4: Newsletter for group 2

Bei Darstellungsproblemen klicken Sie [hier](#).



#### Ihr Weiterbildungsgutschein im Wert von bis zu 15.000,- Euro

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

Nutzen Sie die Chance zum beruflichen Neustart mit einer Qualifizierung im Rahmen der Corona-Joboffensive! Bis zu 15.000,- Euro sind beim AMS Niederösterreich für Ihre zukunftssichere Aus- und Weiterbildung für Sie reserviert.

Finden Sie gemeinsam mit Ihrer AMS-Beraterin oder Ihrem Berater den für Sie richtigen Weg zurück ins Berufsleben und lösen Sie Ihren Weiterbildungsgutschein ein! In diesem Mail zeigen wir Ihnen, wie Ihr beruflicher Neustart gelingen kann.

Nehmen Sie Ihre berufliche Zukunft in die Hand – und bleiben Sie gesund!

Ihr

Sven Hergovich  
Landesgeschäftsführer des AMS Niederösterreich

#### Ihr Gutschein für den Neustart am Arbeitsmarkt



Aktuelle und nachgefragte Qualifikationen sind der wichtigste Erfolgsfaktor für den beruflichen Neustart.

Ob Auffrischkurs für Ihre Fachkenntnisse oder eine Ausbildung mit Lehrabschluss – das AMS Niederösterreich hält eine Vielzahl von Aus- und Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten für Sie bereit.

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#### Eine Auswahl der Berufsausbildungen, für die das AMS die Kosten übernimmt:

- Mechatronik
- Kälteanlagen-technik
- IT-Systemtechnik, Programmierung/Coding, Applikationsentwickler/in
- Kunststofftechnik
- Restaurantfachkraft, Hotel- und Gastgewerbeassistent/in
- Berufskraftfahrer/in
- Finanz- und Rechnungswesenassistent
- Diplomelehrgang Digitaler Vertrieb
- Pflegeassistent, Pflegefachassistent

Ihr Weiterbildungsgutschein im Wert von bis zu € 15.000,-

#### So finanzieren wir Sie während Ihrer Ausbildung



Mit dem Schulungsgeld vom AMS sind Sie während der Ausbildung finanziell abgesichert. Der Betrag entspricht zumindest Ihrem Arbeitslosengeld oder Ihrer Notstandshilfe und wird unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen aufgestockt.

Zusätzlich erhalten Sie einen Bildungsbonus in Höhe von 4€ pro Tag, wenn Sie Arbeitslosengeld oder Notstandshilfe beziehen. Ihre Ausbildung zumindest vier Monate dauert und noch in diesem Jahr startet.

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#### Vorsorge und Sicherheit: Ihre Ausbildung während der COVID-19-Maßnahmen



Das AMS nimmt die Situation um die COVID-19-Pandemie ernst. Deswegen passen wir gemeinsam mit unseren Partnerinstituten den Kursbetrieb laufend den gerade erforderlichen Corona-Schutzmaßnahmen an.

Damit Sie gesund bleiben und dennoch Ihre Ausbildung starten können, richtet sich das AMS dabei nach dem Grundsatz:

**So viel Distance Learning wie möglich – so viel Präsenzunterricht wie notwendig!**

#### Informieren Sie sich jetzt!

Jetzt informieren unter

050 904 343

Oder Sie schreiben uns ein [E-Mail](#).

Sie möchten mehr über Ihre Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten erfahren oder wünschen sich Unterstützung bei der Wahl Ihrer passenden Ausbildung?

Unsere ExpertInnen der AMS-Weiterbildungshotline stehen Ihnen bei Fragen montags bis donnerstags von 07:30h bis 16:00h und freitags von 07:30h bis 12:00h unter der Nummer **050 904 343** gerne telefonisch zur Verfügung.

[>Homepage](#) [>Datenschutz](#) [>Abbestellen](#)

Figure 5: Newsletter for group 3

Bei Darstellungsproblemen klicken Sie [hier](#).



### Ihr Weiterbildungsgutschein im Wert von bis zu 15.000,- Euro

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

Nutzen Sie die Chance zum beruflichen Neustart mit einer Qualifizierung im Rahmen der Corona-Jobhoffenliste bis zu 15.000,- Euro sind beim AMS Niederösterreich für Ihre zukunftssichere Aus- und Weiterbildung für Sie reserviert.

Finden Sie gemeinsam mit Ihrer AMS-Beraterin oder Ihrem Berater den für Sie richtigen Weg zurück ins Berufsleben und lösen Sie Ihren Weiterbildungsgutschein ein! In diesem Mail zeigen wir Ihnen, wie Ihr beruflicher Neustart gelingen kann.

Nehmen Sie Ihre berufliche Zukunft in die Hand – und bleiben Sie gesund!

Ihr

Sven Hergovich  
Landesgeschäftsführer des AMS Niederösterreich

### Ihr Gutschein für eine Aus- und Weiterbildung mit Jobgarantie



Aktuelle und nachgefragte Qualifikationen sind der wichtigste Erfolgsfaktor für den beruflichen Neustart.

Ob Auffrischkurs für Ihre Fachkenntnisse oder eine Ausbildung mit Lehrabschluss – das AMS Niederösterreich hält eine Vielzahl von Aus- und Weiterbildungsmöglichkeiten für Sie bereit.

Mit hochwertigen Ausbildungen in nachgefragten Berufen, verbessern Sie wesentlich Ihre Chancen auf einen sicheren Arbeitsplatz.

### Eine Auswahl der Berufsausbildungen, für die das AMS die Kosten übernimmt:

- Mechatronik
- Kälteanlagen-technik
- IT-Systemtechnik, Programmieren/Coding, Applikationsentwickler/in
- Kunststofftechnik
- Restaurantfachkraft, Hotel- und Gastgewerbeassistent/in
- Berufskraftfahrer/in
- Finanz- und Rechnungswesenassistent
- Diplomelehrgang Digitaler Vertrieb
- Pflegeassistent, Pflegefachassistent

Ergreifen Sie die Chance und finden Sie gemeinsam mit unseren Expertinnen und Experten Ihren persönlichen Weg zum beruflichen Neustart. Mit Ihrem persönlichen Weiterbildungsgutschein verschaffen Sie sich einen wertvollen Startvorteil.

Ihr Weiterbildungsgutschein im Wert von bis zu € 15.000,-

### Die aktuellen Top Jobs am niederösterreichischen Arbeitsmarkt

- **Elektroinstallateur(e)Innen, -monteur(e)Innen**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **343**
- **Dipl. Krankenpfleger, -schwestern**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **229**
- **Kraftfahrer/innen (alle Bereiche)**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **228**
- **Maurer/innen**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **170**
- **Techniker/innen für Datenverarbeitung**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **159**
- **Rohrinstallateur(e)Innen, -monteur(e)Innen**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **157**
- **Hotel- und Gaststättenberufe**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **132**
- **Techniker/innen für Maschinenbau**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **117**
- **Pflegeassistent/in**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **110**
- **Medizinisch-technische Fachkräfte (m./w.)**  
beim AMS NÖ gemeldete offene Stellen im Jänner: **81**

### So finanzieren wir Sie während Ihrer Ausbildung



Mit dem Schulungsgeld vom AMS Sie sind während der Ausbildung finanziell abgesichert. Der Betrag entspricht zumindest Ihrem Arbeitslosengeld oder Ihrer Notstandshilfe und wird unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen aufgestockt.

Zusätzlich erhalten Sie einen Bildungsbonus in Höhe von 4€ pro Tag, wenn Sie Arbeitslosengeld oder Notstandshilfe beziehen, Ihre Ausbildung zumindest vier Monate dauert und noch in diesem Jahr startet.

### Vorsorge und Sicherheit: Ihre Ausbildung während der COVID-19-Maßnahmen

Figure 6: Newsletter for group 4